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The Internet Direct Public Offering:
Establishing Trust in a
Disintermediated Capital Market 
Jason Trainor †
Whereas the process of financial intermediation wasIntroduction 
once human capital and relationship intensive, 5 it is now
heavily influenced by technological innovation and con-mall- and medium-sized business enterprises (SMEs)1
sumer demand, factors which have tended to disrupt theS have consistently encountered difficulties in tapping
monopoly power of financial intermediaries.into the public equity markets in Canada. This problem
has been shaped by a number of economic, regulatory Technological innovation alone, however, is not suf-
and functional barriers to full participation by smaller ficient to replace the institutions and actors that previ-
issuers in the Canadian capital market. ously dominated the market for public offerings; rather,
the concept of disintermediation by definition creates aThe fundamental dilemma involves reducing the
vacuum that must be filled. Law firms and otherinformational asymmetries between the private business
intermediaries can create additional value for their cli-enterprise and its prospective public investors. For
ents by assuming some or all of the tasks currentlysmaller firms, the costs of disclosing firm-specific infor-
apportioned to investment bankers in the public offeringmation to potential investors is substantial in relation to
process.the size of the investment. 2 Given the fundamental pre-
cept of securities regulation that investors must be Theoretical models created within the field of
capable of making decisions based upon efficient, accu- behavioural economics are useful in guiding securities
rate and timely information,3 it is necessary to consider regulators, lawyers, and academics to a fuller under-
the sources through which information pertaining to standing of the current limitations inhibiting the realiza-
specific issuers is processed and distributed to the atom- tion of a functioning disintermediated marketplace for
istic group of individuals and firms investing in the cap- securities. Ultimately, the argument calls for the creation
ital markets. of a market environment where the decreased cost com-
ponent of a disintermediated offering is complementedIn the public offering context, a range of
by reputational elements that import legitimacy into theintermediaries are involved in filtering large volumes of
offering. As technology and the presence of otherinformation about the corporate issuer. The participa-
intermediaries have replicated or avoided many of thetion (or lack thereof) by these intermediaries creates a
justifications for direct underwriter involvement innumber of costs and other barriers to effective participa-
smaller public offerings, it remains to be consideredtion. The most problematic of the traditional
whether such instruments and institutions are capable ofintermediaries for small business finance has been the
nurturing and sustaining the trust-based attributes ofinvestment bank.
traditional reputational intermediaries. Effective dis-Significant attention has recently been directed to
intermediation in the securities markets will remain anthe possibility that the Internet can operate as an effec-
elusive objective as long as the impediments to the devel-tive vehicle for small business financing. Setting aside the
opment of trust remain in place.excessive hyperbole concerning the ‘‘Internet revolu-
tion’’, it has nevertheless been consistently argued over At a broader level, a responsible approach to the
the preceding two decades that advances in information access to capital problem should reflect the belief that a
technology will significantly impact the activities of the properly functioning market is an instrument of social
institutions and private actors operating in the capital control capable of influencing broader social objectives
markets. 4 Indeed, the technological disintermediation of (as opposed to being an institution with an insular focus
the capital markets should not be viewed as a revolution, responsive only to the needs of its participants). 6 A more
but rather as an evolutionary process that remains a efficient capital market providing enhanced access for
potentiality instead of a fully-developed instrumentality. smaller issuers can contribute meaningfully to the eco-
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48 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
nomic welfare of the greater society. A coherent proposal future prospects, or some objective mechanism for mea-
for regulatory reform and institutional development suring the quality of information disclosure, the investor
must balance the competing objectives of offering is left without a legitimate basis for attributing value to
enhanced access to capital for small businesses while not the company’s securities. The result is a tendency for
exacerbating the market risk posed to investors by such investors to discount credible information and place a
developments. relative premium on corrupt sources of information,
with securities prices ultimately reflecting the averageA brief examination of the problem of informa-
(lower) quality of information.11 The choices available totional asymmetry is followed by a look at the economic
the issuer may therefore be predetermined by the degreeand regulatory costs imposed upon smaller issuers. This
of information ‘‘opaqueness’’ that confronts the investor:paper then turns to an examination of the ‘‘functional’’
small, start-up enterprises tend to be most information-inhibitors to growth posed by the role of traditional
ally opaque while larger, more seasoned issuers gravitatemarket intermediaries and reviews the concept of dis-
toward more transparent positions on the continuum.12intermediation, focusing on the promise of the Internet
Larger issuers with public share listings are the mostdirect public offering as a means of achieving a function-
informationally transparent, having expanded theirally disintermediated securities market and the obstacles
formal corporate governance structure and increasedcurrently impeding the realization of that goal. Finally,
their level of market disclosure, first through privatethis paper looks at the lack of trust as the ‘‘weakest link’’
sources of finance and later through the public offeringin the disintermediation edifice, and proposes a work-
process.able means for establishing trust in the disintermediated
marketplace. A more benign manifestation of the informational
asymmetry problem exists in the secondary markets.
Assuming one accepts the postulates of efficient capital
market theory, 13 existing market disclosure contributesInformational Asymmetry to the accurate pricing of securities, at least partially
negating the problem of informational asymmetry.lthough present in numerous types of markets,
lnformational efficiency is presumed to be more pro-A informational asymmetries are particularly pro-
nounced in the market for seasoned offerings, a findingnounced in financial markets. The information asym-
that has been reflected in the reduced regulatory bur-metry dilemma attempts to explain and confront the
dens of ‘‘POP’’14 and Shelf15 offerings.16potential for distorted incentives in the capital markets
where one party to a financial transaction has informa- The information asymmetry inherent in the bilat-
tion that another party is lacking.7 The classic exposition eral relationship between issuer and investor has man-
of the theory considers the process of exposing ‘‘lemons’’ dated the intervention of third party intermediaries to
in a group of used automobiles.8 The automobile market temper the impact of informational deficiencies in the
is one in which goods are sold both honestly and dishon- market for initial public offerings. Issuers must therefore
estly, with the seller being the only party who has true encounter direct and indirect costs and other barriers in
knowledge of the quality of the automobile. The indi- attempts to utilize the resources provided by the various
vidual purchaser may or may not be cheated, depending intermediaries. The following sections examine the
on the honesty of the seller and/or the purchaser’s ability various ‘‘inhibitors’’ to public financing that confront the
to identify quality in such an environment. Moreover, prospective issuer in its attempt to raise capital.
the process has broader implications for the entire
market. The existence of sellers capable of exercising
dishonesty in their dealings tends to drive honest dealers
The Small Business Capital Barrier:and their automobiles out of the marketplace.9
Regulatory and EconomicIn the public offering context, the problem of infor-
Inhibitors to Growth mation asymmetry arises when prospective investors are
faced with incomplete information about a company in
which they must decide whether to invest. For SMEs, The small business capital barrier information about the company typically remains in the
hands of company insiders. This circle of knowledge mall businesses in Canada have faced significant dif-
may be more or less exclusive depending on the size, S ficulties in maintaining adequate levels of capitaliza-
corporate governance structure, and previous financing tion to finance their operations.17 Commonly referred to
activities of the enterprise. Indeed, the problem faced by as the ‘‘small business capital barrier’’, the phenomenon
new issuers lies somewhere along the informational effi- has inhibited the growth of SMEs in Canada. Indeed,
ciency continuum between a market in which buyers undercapitalization has been cited as one of the primary
must attribute value to a nebulous ‘‘black box’’10 and causes of business failure in start-up enterprises.18 Small
that of an efficient, well-informed marketplace for the businesses face disproportionately high barriers to public
prospective issuer’s capital. Without credible sources of equity financing than larger issuers. This is reflected in





























































Establishing Trust in a Disintermediated Capital Market 49
based upon the high fixed costs of the offering process relate to satisfying the regulatory requirements of the
and the costs associated with satisfying the regulatory offering process. It is important to recognize that many
burdens of a public offering. of these expenses are fixed costs and as such dispropor-
tionately impact upon smaller issuers. The various eco-For the purposes of this article, the traditional attrib-
nomic inhibitors can be broken down into direct andutes of the small business capital barrier are divided into
indirect costs.three categories, which are referred to as ‘‘inhibitors’’.
The first is composed of regulatory inhibitors and is
comprised of the numerous obstacles presented by the Direct costs 
existing regime of securities regulation. The second
Direct costs to an issuer in a traditional publicfocuses on economic inhibitors, which involve the direct
offering consist of the costs incurred by the retention ofand indirect costs imposed upon an issuer who attempts
intermediaries (lawyers, auditors, underwriters, etc.), andto ‘‘go public’’. Finally, there are what can be termed
other miscellaneous direct expenditures necessary to‘‘functional’’ inhibitors. This category examines the func-
complete the offering. Legal and accounting costs havetions of the IPO process traditionally delegated by issuers
been estimated at approximately $200,000 to $400,000.29to third party intermediaries. After this paper presents
The issuer also faces direct expenses in the form of thesome insight into the new technologies that have acted
printing costs associated with a paper-based prospectusto ‘‘disintermediate’’ the market for initial public offer-
and other offering materials. 30 The largest single expense,ings, a fourth category is revealed: the ‘‘reputational’’
however, is that levied by the underwriter, which typi-inhibitor.
cally charges a variable amount determined as a per-
centage of the offering price, usually in the range of
Regulatory inhibitors 4 to 9 per cent , along with additional fees for disburse-
ments and other matters. 31 The total direct costs to theThe securities regulation regime in Canada has cre-
issuer for a public offering of less than $5 million haveated some significant regulatory barriers that have tradi-
been estimated to be 22.6 per cent  of the issue pro-tionally prevented or otherwise discouraged smaller
ceeds. 32 This can be contrasted with the average totalcompanies from successfully raising funds on the public
cost for IPOs between $5 million and $10 million, whichmarkets.
have been estimated to amount to approximately 12Before being permitted to distribute20 securities to
per cent of the offering. 33 Larger offerings feature eventhe public, a prospective issuer must satisfy a number of
smaller proportions of the total cost being devoted toregulatory requirements, including the provincial regis-
underwriting fees. 34tration21 and prospectus22 requirements, 23 which can be
expensive and time consuming and typically require the
retention of outside experts. 24 The process can be long Indirect costs 
and sometimes tedious, as the drafters must attempt to One of the largest indirect costs to an issuer is cre-
assuage the competing demands of the parties to the ated by the tendency for new issues to be underpriced.
transaction as well as the regulatory authorities. There In essence, the problem explains the prevalent practice in
may be several drafts of a prospectus document before which the offering price for securities is artificially set
the filing of the preliminary prospectus as well as during below the anticipated equilibrium price in the
the period between the filing of the preliminary pro- aftermarket. 35 Initially understood as an anomaly, the
spectus and the approval of the final prospectus by pro- underpricing phenomenon has consistently found
vincial securities regulators. 25 empirical support in financial and legal literature, 36 and
The registration and prospectus requirements must has been widely recognized as a selling technique by
be satisfied in all provincial jurisdictions in which the underwriters attempting to sell the maximum amount
securities will be distributed. 26 The issuer is also of securities possible. The technique has been criticized
expected to satisfy the listing requirements of the as one of the more potent manifestations of the short-
exchange on which the securities will be listed.27 term incentive structure of the contemporary capital
markets. 37 The problem is most prevalent when theThe requirements pertaining to the disclosure of
offering is distributed to the public in a firm-commit-audited financial statements have also had an impact
ment, 38 fixed-price offering. The dynamics of this formupon smaller issuers, although securities regulators have
of offering create incentives for the underwriters to sellexhibited some flexibility in this area. 28
underwritten securities as soon as possible in order toSatisfaction of the various regulatory provisions con-
shield themselves from adverse market or issuer-relatedtributes significantly to the second inhibitor, which
developments that can affect the price of the securities. 39focuses on the costs of the process.
As a result, the securities are typically sold to institutional
investors upon whom the underwriters and their bro-
Economic inhibitors kerage appendages can rely as an expedient source of
Issuers planning to conduct a public offering are high-volume sales. Compounding the problem for SMEs






























































50 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
the case of ‘‘riskier’’ offerings.40 In Canada, the problem In sum, the public offering process is a costly
has been verified by a number of researchers, whose burden that many small businesses cannot afford to bear.
findings have for the most part mirrored those in other Such concerns prompted the recent OSC Task Force on
industrialized countries. 41 Small Business Financing to conclude that the offering
process ‘‘cannot be a cost-effective way of raising less
Brief mention should also be made of the long-term than $2-3 million’’. 53
corre la te  o f  the  underpr ic ing phenomenon:
The preclusive nature of IPO expenses for smallerunderperformance. Empirical studies have shown that
issuers also has impacts that can be felt beyond the indi-the long-run performance of IPOs has tended to be
vidual issuer. Viewed through a financial growth cycleweak, 42 often underperforming against non-IPO securi-
paradigm in which different capital structures andties when both classes of investments are tracked over
financing strategies are optimal at different points in thethe same time period,43 although recent studies have
life cycle of a business, 54 the effects of the current modelindicated otherwise. 44 The long-run performance ques-
of small business financing also have potential negativetion nevertheless remains important, given that the long-
effects on the welfare of market intermediaries. Suc-term performance of the equity markets has been found
cessful small business ventures may ultimately requireto influence the investing patterns of most investors. 45
intermediated sources of capital. As a business venture
The combined effect of underwriter influence in matures beyond the point at which early-stage small
s h o r t - t e r m  u n d e r p r i c i n g  a n d  l o n g - t e r m business loans, ‘‘angel’’ financing,55 and venture capitalist
underperformance is that issuers receive a lower receipt funding can provide sources of capital that are adequate
price for their securities, 46 institutional investors (and to their current or expected needs, the next logical step is
other highly sophisticated actors) are permitted to ben- to take the company public. The preclusive nature of the
efit at the expense of ordinary investors, 47 and under- current process acts to dissuade contemplative issuers
writers retain supranormal profits. The inefficiencies in from attempting to go public. This contributes to the
the IPO market can also act to discourage privately-held stultification of the new issues market for SMEs, and
companies from making the jump to the public equity creates fewer opportunities for the market intermediaries
markets. It has been suggested that if IPOs were priced at who might otherwise assist such an endeavour. More-
closer to their expected long-term value, the market over, the availability of a vibrant IPO market for SMEs
would be hospitable to greater IPO activity, since public has been proven to stimulate the involvement of early-
offerings would be willingly undertaken by issuers and stage financing intermediaries by providing them with a
underwriters at more points in the market cycle. 48 Ulti- viable exit strategy, which is an attractive feature for
mately, the inefficiencies represent a distortion of the private equity investors who may be concerned about
productive allocation of goods and services in the being locked into a particular investment for an
economy.49 extended period of time.56 This factor in turn contrib-
utes to lowering the cost of capital during the earlierAnother indirect issuer expense relates to the oppor-
stage.tunity cost of diverted management time and effort. The
company’s senior management must devote a significant More importantly, the chilling effect on the IPO
volume of manpower to the task of preparing the com- market can have much broader effects on the economy
pany for the offering. Recent estimates have suggested as a whole, given the fundamental importance of small
that an IPO can consume approximately 20 weeks of businesses in innovation, job creation, and the general
senior management time, which can be calculated as health and stability of the economy.57 Small businesses
costing up to an additional 7 per cent  of the offering are vital to economic development and contribute dis-
price. 50 This diversion of management attention often proportionately to employment and growth.58 As a
occurs during a crucial stage of the company’s develop- result, the availability of cost-effective public equity
ment, 51 and can have a significant negative impact on a financing and the institutions that are capable of facili-
small company that does not have sufficient manage- tating this form of fundraising can contribute meaning-
ment depth to simultaneously attend to other important fully to the long-run performance of the economy.59
aspects of the company’s operations.
Moreover, smaller companies are often subject to
costs arising from structural and other changes to the
‘‘Functional’’ Inhibitors: Marketbusiness prompted by comments in ‘‘deficiency’’ letters
drafted by securities regulators in the prospectus Intermediaries 
approval process, a factor that can also create substantial
delays in the offering process. 52 Finally, a company that s the previous section has identified, the direct costs
successfully completes a public offering becomes imme- A incurred by issuers in a public offering are heavily
diately subject to the ongoing costs of regulatory compli- influenced by the retention of certain types of intermedi-
ance stemming from the continuous disclosure obliga- ation services that have traditionally been considered a






























































Establishing Trust in a Disintermediated Capital Market 51
metries in the capital markets. While acknowledging mizing the true value of liabilities and other negative
that financial market intermediaries fulfill a range of aspects of the business. The absence of credible informa-
functions in the public offering process, the focus here is tion about the prospective issuer or some objective
on the effects of these third-party institutions in reducing mechanism for measuring the quality of information dis-
the informational barriers between the primary partici- closure prevents investors from making informed deci-
pants. Third party intermediaries fulfill two inter-related sions about the company’s securities. 61 Credible informa-
functions in redressing the problem of informational tion transfer therefore emerges as a prerequisite to an
asymmetry: first, by facilitating the flow of information efficient and effective securities market.
about a particular security, and second, by confirming Intermediaries have traditionally assumed an
the credibility of information flowing from the prospec- important role in transferring information from the
tive issuer to the investing public. It must also be recog- issuer to the investor, thereby rectifying the incapacity of
nized that the various market intermediaries perform the corporate principal to screen for quality. The inter-
other functions that are not directly related to over- mediary possesses the capability to impartially evaluate
coming informational barriers, and brief mention is issuer data and can assume a prominent position
made of such functions where appropriate. After between issuers and investors. The existence of a credible
exploring the general role of intermediaries in the capital intermediary can emit a ‘‘signal’’ to investors that the
markets, the focus of this part shifts to the role of the issuer for which it has processed and certified informa-
underwriter in the offering process, given that the costs tion exhibits quality and thus its securities are a worthy
incurred by their participation or, paradoxically, their investment (relative to the investment preferences of the
refusal to participate in the process, has traditionally investor). The process contributes to substantially
presented the most significant impediment to capital reducing the search costs faced by investors.
raising by smaller issuers. Brief mention is also made of
A crude analogy in the strict bilateral context mightthe role of other intermediaries in the offering process.
be drawn to the consumer product warranty, where theThe criticisms pertaining to the costs and other inef-
existence of a warranty, and moreover, its terms (in com-ficiencies engendered by the participation of various
parison to the warranty terms of other similar products),market intermediaries in the public offering process have
can reduce the ultimate costs of assessing product qualityoften been accompanied by suggestions to alter the tradi-
for consumers wishing to purchase the product. 62 War-tional roles played by these actors. Indeed, it has been
ranties have proven to be an effective alternative methodsuggested that issuers can benefit from the elimination
of signaling quality in situations where verifiable disclo-of third parties who are positioned between the enter-
sure is costly or impossible in a marketplace of riskprise and its investors. The Internet direct public offering
averse consumers. 63has received great attention as a potential means of
To the extent that the intermediary possesses theachieving that end. Before examining the utility of the
capabilities and incentives to accurately evaluate theInternet offering process, it is necessary to explore the
informational and behavioural components of thefunctional rationale for third party intermediation in the
issuer’s business, investors will be willing to pay a pre-market for public offerings.
mium for the issuer’s securities, and issuers will be
willing to compensate the intermediary accordingly. 64 ItIntermediation 
has been suggested that an issuer will therefore beThe traditional rationale for intermediation is based
willing to pay a premium for certification services whereupon the simple fact that an issuing company cannot be
the revenue arising from the market’s acknowledgmententrusted to fulfill certain core functions of the offering
of certified (and therefore presumably accurate) informa-process. Although it can attempt to produce and dissemi-
tion exceeds the cost difference imposed on the issuer bynate information intended for investors, it cannot pro-
retaining the services of the intermediary. 65 In reality,vide an objective measure of certification. In other words,
however, the choice is not that simple. As a subsequentaside from the securities law requirement that the issuer
section of this paper makes apparent, the market forprovide a certificate pronouncing full, plain and true
intermediary services does not always permit the issuerdisclosure, 60 it cannot credibly prove to investors that the
to make that choice. 66company’s disclosure data is reliable and accurate before
the information is disseminated to solicit interest in the While the terms ‘‘intermediary’’ and ‘‘gatekeeper’’
company’s securities. Moreover, the problem facing the are often used interchangeably, the two functions have
issuer can be deeper than mere certification. The incen- distinct characteristics. An ‘‘intermediary’’ is a more gen-
tive for truthful disclosure might not only be lacking, but eralized concept, referring simply to third parties that
there might actually be perverse incentives to misrepre- perform intermediation services between two or more
sent the true state of the company’s affairs in order to actors. The process may be passive or active, but does not
reap the benefits of an inflated offering price. Simply require the formal participation of the third party in
stated, there can be tangible benefits to the issuer for influencing the behaviour or disclosure of the principal.
exaggerating the positive attributes of the company’s The term ‘‘gatekeeper’’, however, connotes a more active






























































52 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
gatekeeper, the intermediary moves beyond the role of behaviour that can range from ‘‘fraud-on-the-interme-
mere middleman to become an active guardian of the diary’’ to third-party negligence, and formal ex post sanc-
rights and interests of other actors that are external to the tions for this form of gatekeeper failure should attempt
immediate intermediary — principal relationship. The to reflect its true nature. This problem invites a consider-
gatekeeper positions itself between the principal and ation of whether liability should appropriately shift to
other actors and exercises its power to intervene or the party whose acts are most culpable, with formal or
refuse to intervene in an attempt to alter the incentives informal sanctions dependant on the position of the
of the principal or protect the interests of others. The negligent or malfeasant intermediary on the liability con-
concept of responsibility is therefore coincident with the tinuum.
fulfillment of the gatekeeping role. The gatekeeper is Finally, there remains the ultimate intangible vari-
responsible for maintaining the principal’s compliance able: gatekeeper fallibility. Even an underwriter’s or
with accepted norms and quality standards. These norms auditor’s most innovative financial modelling and
and standards are context specific and are as much a accounting practices might attribute an inaccurate value
reflection of the particular market for gatekeeping ser- to an issuer and its financial position, and a securities
vices as the market for the goods or services of the prin- lawyer’s most comprehensive due diligence investigation
cipal. can overlook a crucial liability issue. The intermediary
must be understood as the aggregate of its human andAn effective third party enforcement strategy
technological components. Human error, while to becapable of successfully certifying the informational
strenuously avoided, can ultimately occur. This cannotquality or altering the behaviour of the principal must
be easily accounted for in evaluating the services of theprescribe an enforceable duty upon the intermediary
intermediary, lest the fallibility of an individual firm orthat forces it to avert misconduct by the principal when
source of intermediation be frequently manifest. Simi-detected 67 or, in the alternative, disavow their role as
larly, the integrity of a technological system or device isgatekeeper. In the presence of an enforceable duty, the
rarely beyond reproach. Faced with the inevitablenecessary ex ante gatekeeper enforcement/certification
absence of human and technological perfection, thestrategy can therefore be understood as a more benign
appropriate system of gatekeeper protection must bevariant of the primal ‘‘fight or flight’’ mechanism in
capable of tolerating some deviation from absolute accu-which an organism is forced to respond when thrust into
racy.situations that heighten its exposure to dangerous conse-
It also bears mention that the ex ante gatekeepingquences. 68 Intermediaries faced with a poor quality (or
function is not limited to the private sphere. Rather, acorrupt) issuer can either cope with the situation by
range of public and quasi-public institutions, includingforcing the principal to conform to their expectations, or
securities regulators, stock markets, self-regulatory orga-the third-party can withdraw its services. 69 For example,
nizations, and the courts continue to play a meaningfulan accountant or lawyer can withhold an audit letter or
role in exercising the gatekeeping function in contempo-legal opinion, or the underwriter can refuse to distribute
rary securities markets. Unlike private intermediaries, thethe offering. 70 The existence of an enforceable duty
gatekeeping functions of public intermediaries fulfillintroduces the notion that gatekeeper responsibility nec-
both ex ante and ex post functions. Examples of ex anteessarily incorporates a substantial element of self-interest,
gatekeeping include such functions as prospectus reviewas the gatekeeper must protect itself from externalized
by securities regulators and the listing standards andthreats posed by the behaviour of the principal or risk
application procedures enforced by stock exchanges.the possibility of sanction.
Obvious examples of ex post gatekeeping include regula-Moreover, the existence of an intermediary need tory sanctions such as the broad public interest sanc-not necessarily be an accurate signal of quality. While tions, 73 statutory civil liability for misrepresentation in a
intermediation has the capacity for redressing the infor- prospectus, 74 common law causes of action,75 and the
mational barriers in the securities markets, the presence delisting and cease-trade orders imposed by stock
of intermediation per se is not sufficient to conclude that exchanges. Their formal roles remain essential to anthe problems have been resolved. 71 Indeed, there remain effective gatekeeping strategy and must be adapted to
a number of potentialities that are capable of lessening any revised gatekeeper strategy that might be devised.
the ultimate credibility of the gatekeeper function. The
first is the possibility that a corrupt principal can ‘‘shop
the market’’ for a compliant gatekeeper or otherwise Gatekeeper liability regimes 
attempt to corrupt an otherwise legitimate gatekeeper. 72 It is important to emphasize that the enforcement
Second, the possibility exists that the principal can and certification functions of gatekeeping services can be
dupe an unsuspecting intermediary. In such a case, the enhanced through the imposition of juristic and/or pri-
gatekeeper might have been duly diligent in its inspec- vate liability mechanisms. While gatekeepers are
tion of the principal, but has been misled or otherwise intended to monitor and alter the behaviour of the prin-
deceived into certifying information that is false. This cipals under their watchful eye, an appropriate gate-






























































Establishing Trust in a Disintermediated Capital Market 53
imperfections that have been internalized within the Equally important, however, are the private inducements
various intermediary functions. to gatekeeper responsibility, forces that impose a private
sphere  o f  ga tekeeper  l i ab i l i ty  upon marketWhere the threat of direct sanction against the prin- intermediaries.cipal proves to be an ineffective deterrent, collateralized
liability regimes (both formal and informal) can compen- Ultimately, the success of an intermediary in dis-
sate the ineffectual mechanisms for enforcing primary closing analytical information about the issuer permits
liability. Direct deterrence, for example, is often con- other market participants to make an ex post determina-
ceived as a poor strategy for enforcing legal norms where tion of the intermediary’s credibility. 80 Herein lies the
the principal actors lack the capacity to make self-inter- most effective and most persistent means of ensuring
ested compliance decisions. 76 Furthermore, the principal that the gatekeeper fulfills its responsibilities to external
actors may plot their present and future course of action actors. The credibility of the intermediary’s past provi-
with reference to a risk–reward paradigm in which the sion of gatekeeping services becomes reconstituted into
potential benefits to be gained from inarticulate disclo- gatekeeper reputation, properly understood as a valuable
sure or other variances from expected standards of beha- yet intangible measure of accuracy and credibility.
viour are calculated to outweigh the potential sanctions Because the issuer and the intermediary make sig-arising from detection. Although it has been suggested nificant investments (each within their own sphere ofthat the imposition of a regime featuring severe penalties expertise) in informational credibility, each hold ais the obvious choice for countering such imperfections, reputational stake in the outcome (measured througha variety of constraints militate against the effectiveness the ultimate valuation of the principal entity’s securities,of severity. 77 Severe penalties might appear to be an relative to the quality of initial and subsequent informa-effective deterrent, but the residual value of a principal tional disclosure), and each would be expected to gravi-entity’s assets might effectively preclude recovery (absent tate toward openness and integrity. Principal actorsa persuasive case for piercing the corporate veil in the invest in firm-specific reputational investments, such asmost egregious of cases or the imposition of criminal or advertis ing and brand identi f ication, 81 whilequasi-criminal sanctions against the directing or man- intermediaries invest in reputation through a self-perpet-aging minds of the corporation), and the imposition of uating cycle of credible commitments to informationalsevere punitive measures might disproportionately harm integrity. 82 However, as the previous discussion has out-the ‘‘innocents’’: the employees, creditors, and other lined, there is a disjuncture between the incentives andstakeholder groups that constitute the wider constitu- corresponding reputational sanctions for the principalency of the principal. 78 and intermediary in this context. Given that an interme-
Moreover, a singular reliance on ex post supervision diary exists solely to assist principal entities in accessing
of issuer disclosure and behaviour ignores the positive the resources of participants that are extraneous to the
incentives that an ex ante gatekeeping strategy can principal — intermediary relationship, the reputational
encourage prior to the commission of activities that costs to the intermediary for improperly screening the
might ultimately be subject to an ex post sanction, pos- principal are ultimately higher. In the capital markets
sibly exposing the ‘‘victims’’ of such behaviour to unnec- context, an intermediary (such as an investment bank),
essary loss and little chance for restitution. The liability by its very nature intends to be a repeat player in the
imposed upon gatekeepers coincides with their responsi- capital markets, and thus bears the risk that its reputa-
bility for monitoring the behaviour and informational tion will be tarnished through improper ex ante
integrity of the issuer, recognizing potential failures screening leading to negative ex post results for investors.
within the issuer’s own internal procedures, and pres- Their market reputation thus acts as a conditional surro-
suring the issuer to forego misleading investors or other- gate for credibility; the reputation of the intermediary is
wise obfuscating the quality of information or behaviour strategically held as a ‘‘hostage’’ in exchange for assur-
of the corporation. 79 This form of ex ante screening ances of quality. 83 A veneer of gatekeeper vulnerability is
mechanism is preferable to a singular reliance on liability therefore exposed, as its reputational capital becomes
mechanisms that target the issuer after an investment interwoven with the credibility of the principal. The
has been made in its securities. failure of the principal to uphold its end of the informa-
tional bargain (as verified by the intermediary), subjectsThe primary foundation for a gatekeeper liability the hostage to reputational sanction. Simply stated, theregime is grounded in the regulatory environment services of the intermediary are subsequently devalued,through which the intermediaries operate. Simply put, reducing its utility as a gatekeeper in an informationallygatekeepers are constrained from absolving themselves asymmetrical marketplace, with the ultimate penaltyof their responsibility to monitor and enforce the actions being the reluctance of ostensibly credible principalsof the principal actors by the protections afforded to the from retaining its services.individuals situated externally to the principal and inter-
mediary relationship. As mentioned previously, the regu- It must be remembered that the formal liability
latory state ensures that investors are afforded a mod- regime does not disappear, but is rather reduced to a
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rence and ex post policing efforts. The principal (issuer) by an intermediary such as an investment bank can be
and intermediaries remain subject to liability for misrep- essential for SMEs, since such companies typically lack
resenting the quality of the principal. Nevertheless, the the necessary sophistication to price and otherwise struc-
reputational argument illustrates that the private sphere ture deals. 91
may in fact be the primary ordering mechanism that The agency function also contemplates the actual
‘‘regulates’’ the market for gatekeeper services. Any selling of the company’s securities, a process that
responsible recommendation for reform must therefore includes marketing activities such as ‘‘road shows’’ in
be predicated on altering the private incentive structures which the investment bankers and senior executives of
that predominate in the market for intermediary ser- the company travel to significant markets in order to
vices. This subject is explored in greater detail later in extol the virtues of the offering to potential investors. 92
this paper, where it is revealed that other intermediaries This is an important event in the life cycle of the
are capable of developing sufficient reputational capital offering, as it is at this stage that the investment bankers
to act as a surrogate for existing gatekeepers currently solicit interest from (predominantly institutional) inves-
entrenched in the market for advisory services relating to tors. In firm-commitment offerings, the agency activities
public offerings. also contemplate a ‘‘risk-bearing’’ function, through
The analysis in this section first provides a brief which the underwriter assumes the risk of not selling the
glance at the specific services provided by intermediaries full complement of securities subject to the offering.93
currently operating in the capital markets. The primary The due diligence function focuses on the ability ofemphasis is on the role of investment banking services, the underwriter to certify the ‘‘veracity’’ of issuer disclo-although the services of other intermediaries such as sure under the securities laws. 94 It is at this stage that thelawyers and auditors are also discussed. reputational element of the intermediary’s services plays
a prominent role. In offering its ‘‘seal of approval’’ 95 to
Investment banks and the underwriting the issuer by certifying its informational disclosure, the
process investment bank contributes to the success of the
offering by ‘‘renting’’ its reputation to the issuer.96
The underwriter’s role An additional function performed by the under-
writer in the public offering context is the provision ofAn ‘‘underwriter’’ 84 can be defined as the division of
after-market support following the offering. After-marketan investment banking firm that assists a prospective
support services include the creation and maintenance ofissuer in the process of distributing its securities in the
liquidity in the market for the issuer’s securities, thepublic market through either purchasing the issuer’s
preparation of research reports, and the encouragementsecurities with a view to selling them (a firm-commit-
of ongoing analyst coverage of the securities by thement underwriting) or by entering into a negotiated
research appendages of the investment banking institu-agreement to assist the issuer in selling the securities (an
tion.agency underwriting). The process itself may be under-
taken by a single investment banking firm or a group of
firms led by a managing or lead underwriter operating as Problems for SMEs arising from the underwriter’sa syndicate. 85 In essence, the retention of investment role banking services by companies seeking access to funds in
The traditional need for underwriter participationthe capital markets is a matter of ‘‘hiring the money’’. 86
in the public offering process is highly problematic forUnderwriters are subject to the registration requirements
SMEs hoping to raise public funds. Beyond the purelyunder provincial securities legislation,87 and are indepen-
economic issues raised earlier in this paper, 97 a numberdently regulated by self-regulatory organizations. In
of other factors suggest that the participation (or lackCanada, they are regulated by the Investment Dealers’
thereof) by an underwriter places substantial limitationsAssociation and must conduct their business in a
on the ultimate success of the financing activities of amanner consistent with the by-laws, rules and regula-
smaller corporate entity.tions of the Association.88
A range of functions have been accorded to the Perhaps foremost among such factors is the reluc-
underwriter in the public offering process. Two such tance of investment banks to underwrite smaller issues
functions are most important for the purposes of this of securities. 98 This problem is most acute in the case of
paper: the agency function and the due diligence func- ‘‘prestigious’’ investment banking institutions,99 which
tion. The agency function refers to the underwriter’s role are least likely to devote human resources and reputa-
in pricing, marketing, and selling the offering.89 The tional capital to a smaller offering.100 Empirical studies
agency function also involves the provision of advisory have proven that competition among investment
services for companies contemplating an offering, which banking firms is relatively weak,101 and that there is even
includes an initial ‘‘merit review’’ on behalf of the com- less competition in the market for smaller offerings.
pany to determine whether its securities are worthy of a Compounding the problem is the lack of a developed
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scale financings. 102 A corresponding problem from the from the auditor to provide assurances in respect of the
point of view of the ordinary investor relates to the prospective issuer’s financial condition.110 Lawyers and
inability of unpreferred retail investors to have any auditors are subject to similar statutory sanctions as
meaningful participation in underwritten IPOs.103 Most underwriters in respect of the disclosure of information
retail investors are limited to purchasing the shares of to investors.
IPOs of any sized company in the secondary market. Finally, the role of private equity should not be
The net effect of the various factors is the creation of discounted in any consideration of intermediaries in the
an enormous barrier to entry into the market for public public offering process for SMEs. Private sources of
equity capital. This ultimately forces smaller firms either equity investment, such as venture capital firms and
to abandon the prospect of public equity fundraising or angel investors, can operate as a springboard to the even-
to accept an inefficient outcome in the event that they tual acquisition of funds in the public equity markets.
are able to secure the support of an investment bank. Venture capitalists (VCs) provide more than financial
support to start-up entities; rather, they provide substan-
tial managerial guidance in the early stages of the lifeOther intermediaries 
cycle of the business. Like the investment banker,A range of other intermediaries exist in the new
auditor and business lawyer, the VC is a repeat player inissues market that attempt to create value104 for prospec-
the capital markets and furthermore has a high degree oftive issuers. This section will briefly review the current
specialized expertise at small-firm finance and develop-role of lawyers, auditors, and private equity in the public
ment. The venture capital firm typically makes a substan-offering process.
tial investment in a start-up company, nurturing it
Securities lawyers create value for their clients throughout its incubation stages and preparing it for an
(which can be either the investment bank or the issuer eventual public offering through which the VC can
in a public offering) by conducting a due diligence inves- realize the full potential of its investment. 111 The prior
tigation and advising on what constitutes acceptable dis- existence of venture capitalist funding in an SME can
closure. 105 The responsibilities coincident with such a have a tremendous impact on certifying the initial disclo-
role extend beyond fidelity to the client to an apprecia- sure of a prospective issuer, given the VC’s investments in
tion for the role of disclosure in a fair and efficient reputational capital and the financial guidance and infor-
securities market, a factor that has been reflected in the mation production previously undertaken on behalf of
following statement by Stanley Beck, a former Commis- the issuer. 112
sioner of the Ontario Securities Commission:
. . . the securities lawyer is arguably enforcing the terms of
the Act and is clearly the person upon whom the Commis- Disintermediation and the Internetsion, the financial community, and the investing public is
heavily dependent. I am sure that there are many practi- DPO 
tioners that do not care to have the matter put quite that
way, but I suggest that it is in fact the truth of the matter. 106 he problems inherent in the current institutionalT structure of the capital markets presents significantThe securities lawyer plays a central role in the
barriers for SMEs seeking to tap the public equity mar-preparation of the prospectus document, which forms
kets and has led to suggestions that alternative methodsthe ultimate basis for disclosure in the offering. The
of fundraising must be developed. The elimination orexercise of the due diligence investigation by a sophisti-
reduction of the small issuer’s dependence oncated securities lawyer has been honed into model verifi-
intermediaries through technological disintermediationcation procedures which have been described as being
is often cited as a workable solution. The most recent‘‘almost as operational as the bouncer’s duty to check the
manifestation has been the Internet direct publicidentification of underage patrons’’. 107 The ability to
offering (DPO). This section examines the rationale forcreate value for clients has been described as an impor-
disintermediation and explores the possibility that antant attribute of a skilled business lawyer, 108 and it is in
Internet DPO can mitigate many of the current eco-the public offering context that the securities lawyer con-
nomic and functional barriers to growth.sistently achieves this objective. 109
Auditors also fulfill a gatekeeping role in the public
Disintermediation offering process. The auditor is typically the first interme-
diary to develop a relationship with a prospective issuer, A commentator recently defined disintermediation
having performed a variety of accounting tasks for the as ‘‘the rather ungainly term that is used in cyber circles
company long before the decision to go public. Even if to describe the bypassing of middlemen that technology
the auditor has no such long-term relationship with the allows, the circumventing of those who traditionally
company, it is nevertheless one of the first parties to stand between us and the things we desire’’. 113 The term
inspect the financial affairs of the company. An initial has found application beyond the capital markets con-
public offering cannot proceed without the existence of text in areas ranging from e-commerce, 114 banking115
an auditor’s opinion in the formal disclosure documents, and advertising, to the music industry, 116 higher educa-
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ability of governments to accurately tax their residents. 119 into a reconstituted version of itself. Technology alone
The concept contemplates the elimination or reduction cannot resolve the numerous obstacles to small business
of barriers to entry and transactional expenses imposed development posed by the small business capital barrier.
upon parties by the necessity to transact through the Instead, institutions and actors must be realigned in
services of an intermediary. Its current popularity is order to assist smaller ventures in achieving their ulti-
owed to the promise of technological progress as the mate objectives. The technological promise of the
instrumentality for realizing its objectives. Internet is therefore best seen as a tool for shaping the
parameters of functions that are to be ultimately fulfilledGatekeeping services create a series of costs that
by human agents. 124 For this reason, it might be moremust be borne by the principal actors operating within
accurate to describe the desired environment asthe marketplace for gatekeeper services. Although their
‘‘reintermediated’’125 rather than disintermediated.purpose is to create the conditions for the positive devel-
In a functionally reconstituted securities market, theopment of their principals, the services of the interme-
services traditionally provided by one type of interme-diary can also operate to the detriment of the principal.
diary can be unbundled and subsequently rebundledDirect costs must be incurred as a matter of course, but
into a broader array of ‘‘mix-and-match’’ service bundlesadverse indirect costs also result from the provision of
that correspond with the needs of start-up enterprises ingatekeeping services. In Akerlof’s market for ‘‘lemons’’,
search of financing. 126 As Professor Langevoort accuratelythe private market intermediaries created to increase the
predicted almost two decades ago, the principal actors inwelfare of market participants have adverse social costs.
the capital markets are apt to pursue services that pro-Through their attempts to centralize information for the
vide an efficient means of reducing dependence on anatomistic market participants, these private institutions
intermediary. He argued that issuers ‘‘will use under-become concentrations of power. 120 Other indirect costs
writers only to the extent that underwriting serves oneare incurred as a result of the liability regime underlying
or more of the [underwriting] functions more efficientlythe market for gatekeeping services. These costs are ulti-
than do other methods of achieving the same objectives,mately passed on to the beneficiaries of the regime.121
such as direct distribution by the issuer’’. 127There also remains the possibility of screening error or
the existence of improper incentives on the part of
intermediaries. Certification services are never perfect, The Internet direct public offering 
and rational purchasers may not be capable of properly The Internet direct public offering (DPO) has
assessing the value of such services.122 recently garnered significant attention for its potential to
The basic argument for disintermediation in the reconstitute the functional roles performed by
capital markets takes as its starting point the problems intermediaries within the contemporary capital markets.
underlying intermediated sources of capital and, in turn, In the last several years, small issuers have attempted to
suggests that principal actors now have the technological distribute securities directly over the Internet without
capacity to internalize many of the functions tradition- the intermediation of a traditional investment bank. It is
ally performed by market intermediaries.123 By reducing clear that Internet technology can have a significant
their dependence on intermediaries, it is presumed that impact on redressing the informational asymmetries in
prospective issuers can overcome many of the economic the market by reducing the cost of gathering, analyzing
and functional barriers that previously impaired their and disseminating information.128 However, its effects on
ability to raise public equity funds. other functional elements of the offering process must be
subject to greater scrutiny. It is generally agreed that theTo briefly recap the rationale for technological dis-
Internet presents advantages to smaller companies byintermediation in the capital markets context, the provi-
reducing offering costs and providing access to invest-sion (or lack thereof) of underwriting services by invest-
ment opportunities heretofore reserved for larger issuersment banks creates serious economic and functional
and investors.129impediments to capital raising by smaller issuers. The
typical SME lacks the resources to make significant direct
The DPO process: new technology and new tech-investments in reputational capital, while also suffering
niques from a lack of access to the services of intermediaries
capable of operating as functional surrogates for reputa-
tional capital. Introducing a third variable of lingering Electronic disclosure, the Web-based prospectus, and
suspicion concerning the credibility of new issuers cre- Internet roadshows 
ates a tripartite barrier that effectively discourages the Perhaps the most obvious benefit of the use of the
raising of capital in the public equity markets. Internet in the public offering process is its capacity to
It is important not to fall victim to the excessive disseminate information to large numbers of prospective
hyperbole concerning the ‘‘promise’’ of technological dis- investors instantaneously. The Internet not only provides
intermediation. The concept cannot be perceived as a investors with expanded access to free or low-cost infor-
panacea; rather, it is a potential tool for realigning the mation, but it also greatly enhances the information pro-
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tions inherent in paper-based prospectuses have been retail investors and other individuals who are otherwise
revealed through multimedia disclosure documents that unable to physically attend.141
permit investors to easily proceed from one reference More important to the present discussion is thepoint to another (including external references) through ability of this new medium to reduce the reliance ofthe use of hypertext links. 130 The ability to produce and issuing companies on the traditional underwriter. Com-subsequently amend an electronic prospectus when sig- pany executives can largely bypass the investment dealernificant changes occur in the disclosure material can at this stage, instead offering their own version of thegreatly reduce the cost of producing, printing and dis- marketing technique using company executives totributing paper-based versions of the various docu- convey the intended message. In larger offerings, thements. 131 Securities regulators have already taken a step issuer may nevertheless wish to retain an underwriter forin the direction of electronic disclosure with the intro- this process. In such instances, the Internet version of theduction of the SEDAR132 system, which provides a cen- roadshow should ultimately reduce the cost of thetralized database of public disclosure information. underwriter’s services, omitting the time and expenseAnnual general meetings are also now frequently con- devoted to travel and the production of multipleducted in multimedia format, with live meetings being presentations.simultaneously broadcast over the Internet. The Web-
The Canadian Securities Administrators havebased prospectus is the next logical step in electronic
responded by including provisions regarding Internetdisclosure.
roadshows in National Policy 47-201, which permits
The regulatory response in the United States is to roadshows to be conducted over the Internet provided
accept the use of electronic media as ‘‘an equal alterna- that the waiting period requirements of the Securities
tive to the use of paper-based media’’, 133 so long as it Act are satisfied, and that copies of the preliminary pro-
conforms with the general disclosure rules. In Canada, spectus are made available to each viewer prior to the
two National Policies promulgated by the Canadian transmission of the roadshow. Moreover, it provides for
Securities Administrators 134 attempt to clarify how safety features such as password protection and restric-
market participants can introduce electronic disclosure tions against retransmission.142
options that comply with existing securities laws. The It is important to note that modern public offeringsapproach of both countries has been described as ‘‘regu- will often combine Web-based and traditional activities.lation by analogy’’: 135 regulators simply apply existing For example, Web-based marketing and solicitationsecurities laws to the new electronic delivery mecha- might be accompanied by traditional marketing tech-nisms without drafting substantive alterations to the niques such as the publication of a tombstone advertise-system of securities regulation. There has been some ment in a newspaper; oral presentations to potentialcontroversy in Canada regarding whether such an investors might be used in combination with Internetapproach is ultimately appropriate, or whether more fun- roadshows and other multimedia presentations. 143damental legislative recognition of the electronic disclo-
sure process is warranted.136
Another key development has been the use of the Impact of the Internet on other innovative financing
electronic roadshow. The concept refers to the Web- techniques 
based format of the travel-based marketing and solicita-
The use of the Internet as a vehicle for public offer-tion campaigns undertaken by company executives and
ings also enhances the applicability of other innovativetraditional investment banks. The first electronic road-
financing mechanisms. Foremost is the dutch auction,show occurred in the United States in 1997, 137 while the
which is not new, but does receive additional supportfirst Canadian attempt occurred in 1998.138
through the Internet. The technique allows investors to
The advent of the electronic version of the road- make bids on securities, subject to an offering at the
show has partially eroded some of the traditional barriers maximum amount they are willing to pay for the stock.
that previously hampered smaller companies in the The auctioneer then allocates the securities to the
public offering process. The technique potentially allows highest bidders, gradually moving down the bid scale
the issuer to reach large numbers of investors, analysts until the full allocation is sold. 144 The dutch auction
and money managers at one time without having to model typically increases both the level of transparency
make multiple presentations in disparate locations. 139 It in the setting of security prices and the efficiency of the
can be transmitted to its intended audience in either real offering process (compared with the firm-commitment
time or on a delayed transmission basis, and can incor- underwriting) for issuers, factors which have led some to
porate the traditional question and answer sessions consider the practice a thorn in the side of the invest-
through multiple modes of interaction, including phone- ment banks. In the words of one commentator, ‘‘[t]he
ins and e-mail. 140 The process greatly expands the out- auction process takes away the smoke and mirrors of the
reach potential of the roadshow process, opening up the investment bankers, and they don’t want to lose their
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facilitated by the growth of Internet-based ‘‘auctioneers’’ listic dominance of the traditional investment banks by
who conduct the auctions on behalf of issuing compa- charging lower fees and creating other value-added ser-
nies. 146 vices that have begun to alter the previous necessity for
relationship-based banking services.156 Internet invest-
ment banking institutions, while prevalent in the UnitedInstitutions and actors: new and reconstituted 
States, have not yet taken a firm root in Canada.The institutions and actors operating in the capital
markets have been forced to adapt to advances in tech- Other institutions have emerged that offer to con-
nology. New institutions have emerged to fulfill some of duct comprehensive marketing and advertising cam-
the market openings presented by the disintermediated paigns for prospective issuers, a service that sometimes
financial environment. Moreover, existing actors have extends to assistance with the preparation of the issuer’s
been forced to reconceptualize their role in the new offering materials. 157 Finally, there are also a number of
marketplace for intermediary services. technology-based companies whose sole objective is to
facilitate the electronic aspects of the Internet DPO,
including the preparation of company Web pages andNew institutions 
the development of Web casts for electronic roadshows.New services have arisen to fill the partial void cre-
ated by the disintermediated space. The most common
are the new ‘‘information merchants’’, Web sites created New roles for traditional actors 
to advertise a company’s securities in the hopes of solic-
Capital market intermediaries, such as securitiesiting support for a public offering or private place-
lawyers and auditors, should witness their roles expandment. 147 Most prominent in the United States, these cen-
beyond the traditional functions accorded to them intralized repositories provide a platform on which
the market for initial public offerings. The ability toindividual users can post standardized information for
effectively disintermediate using technological advanceselectronic distribution. 148 Perhaps the most recognized
and other innovative mechanisms to reduce or eliminateinstitution in this regard has been the Angel Capital
the role of the underwriter in the process requires otherNetwork (ACE-Net), a listing service for small corporate
intermediaries to assume greater responsibilities. Theissuers to advertise and solicit accredited investors for
absence of the most costly intermediary does not pre-private placements of securities. 149 Another popular site
clude the need for gatekeeping services; indeed, the pro-in the United States is run by the Grant Street Group,
vision of intermediation services remains a functionalwhich ‘‘creates and maintains customized Web sites for
necessity. Small issuers still require legal and technicalauctions and other transactions of fixed-income and
advice to enable them to complete a successful offering.equity securities that serve the particular needs of issuers,
Moreover, the provision of gatekeepng services is essen-dealers, institutional investors, treasurers and global
tial to provide a minimum level of protection for inves-financial institutions’’. The site has proven to be an effec-
tors that intend to participate in the offering. The prac-tive forum for linking investors with issuers of govern-
tical difference is that now lawyers and auditors mustment debt. 150 The Group has been particularly successful
now undertake the signaling of quality through legal andat linking investors and issuers in purchases of U.S.
informational certification services to a greater degree.municipal and state-level government debt securities. 151
Their ability to successfully fulfill the role of reputational
Similar Internet ‘‘matchmaker’’ services have been intermediary is explored in greater detail later in this
created which compile company business plans and paper.
attempt to ‘‘match’’ them with potential investors. These
‘‘cyber-middlemen’’152 take on a more active role than
the passive bulletin-board style of other information Limitations 
merchants by actively attempting to link investors with A number of problematic issues surrounding theinvestment outlets. Innovations in software technology Internet direct public offering must be acknowledged.can eliminate the free-rider problems previously associ- Two of the most prominent involve retail investor pro-ated with the profitability of information merchants. 153 tection and the lack of demand for DPO securities.
Another proposal involves the creation of new stock Because DPOs are undertaken by smaller, unproven
markets devoted entirely to the smallest of issuers. For companies — a category which has been historically
example, in 1997 the Australian Stock Exchange over-represented in the area of business failures and
‘‘floated’’ a proposal for the creation of an alternative fraudulent market activity — it has been suggested that
capital market where unlisted small businesses could the risks of a DPO outweigh the potential benefits.
solicit investments. 154 Moreover, the Internet’s facilitative effect on other forms
The other major development has been the advent of fraudulent business activity has further stigmatized
of Internet-based investment banks, which have attempts to conduct an Internet-based offering. Indeed,
attempted to respond to the demand for direct public the Internet has become a virtual haven for ‘‘pump and
offerings with specialized services for SMEs attempting to dump’’ operators, who attempt to artificially inflate share
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sophisticated investors who have been deceived into argued that other market intermediaries are capable of
purchasing the shares at artificially high levels. 158 developing sufficient reputational capital to act as a sur-
rogate for existing gatekeepers currently entrenched inIt has also been suggested that there is simply a lack
the market for advisory services relating to public offer-of demand for this type of security. 159 An argument can
ings.be made, however, that the lack of demand correlates
with the perceived absence of an adequate intermediary-
certification presence. In other words, there may be a
problem of ‘‘negative signaling’’ in offerings that do not The ‘‘Weakest Link’’:feature traditional underwriting services. The absence of
Establishing Trust in thean underwriter in a particular offering can be seen to
connote that the offering has been rejected by under- Disintermediated Marketplace 
writers due to the perceived substandard quality of the he expected benefits of technological innovationissuer. This is an argument which is addressed in greater Tmust not be permitted to obscure the problems thatdetail in the final section of this paper, where it is argued remain within the disintermediated marketplace.that the negative reputational signaling problem can be Indeed, as the previous part highlighted, a number ofaddressed through positive inducements to investor obstacles currently impede the development of an activetrust. market for Internet direct public offerings. The most
Perhaps the greatest impediment to utilizing the pressing problem surrounds redressing the perceived
Internet DPO as an innovative and cost-effective deficiency in reputational capital among the new and
financing method is the increased regulatory burden existing intermediaries that are attempting to fill the
faced by issuers who attempt to complete such a transac- void created by technological disintermediation.
tion. In the recent Canadian attempts at Internet DPOs,
This part argues that the establishment of trust is anthe issuers were required to go through the process of
essential component in achieving the full status ofregistering in every province in which the securities were
reputational intermediary. The disintermediated spaceto be distributed, a factor which added additional fees
need not be devoid of trust and reputational induce-and labour to the cost of the offering. Moreover, its very
ments to investment. Although the issue of cost is annovelty created regulatory obstacles because cautious
important component of the innovative financing tech-provincial securities regulators reviewed potential DPOs
niques, it is important to iterate that the introduction ofwith enhanced scrutiny. Uniform procedures among the
Internet direct public offerings must be about more thanvarious jurisdictions for obtaining regulatory approval for
simply reducing costs. Instead, it calls for the creation ofa financing mechanism of this variety do not exist and
a market environment where the decreased cost compo-securing regulatory approval in each jurisdiction proved
nent of a disintermediated offering is complemented byto be an arduous task. The issue became particularly
reputational and certificational elements that importproblematic when smaller provincial securities regula-
legitimacy into the offering. It is possible to envision atory agencies were called upon to review the transac-
regulatory regime that permits and supports greater flexi-tions.
bility in accessing public equity financing — a regime
Finally, it must be recognized that most offerings of that reduces costs while simultaneously signaling quality.
this type are typically ‘‘one-off’’ transactions, whereby the
Other intermediaries are capable of developing suf-company conducts a single financing transaction. The
ficient reputational capital to act as a surrogate forresult is that the prospective issuer depends on its own
existing gatekeepers currently entrenched in the marketWeb-based promotional materials to attract investors.
for advisory services relating to public offerings. Securi-This form of promotional activity relies heavily on a
ties lawyers and auditors are the most prominent exam-passive medium: the company Web site. To create a
ples of intermediaries that are deserving of trust in amore vibrant marketplace for new issue DPOs, Canada
‘‘reintermediated’’ environment.would benefit from the establishment of indigenous
In order to establish this proposition, it is necessarythird party technology providers such as those that have
to expand the scope of analysis beyond the economicproliferated in the United States.
and legal literature to embrace an interdisciplinary per-
spective informed by the intersection of law and the
The record (thus far) behavioural sciences. As an increasingly varied array of
To date, only two Internet DPOs have been con- legal academics have sought recourse to the behavioural
ducted in Canada. 160 This may be partially due to the sciences for its predictive and explanatory reach,161 cor-
limitations outlined above. However, a broader argu- porate and securities law scholars have turned to the
ment can be made that the appropriate conditions for a social sciences for the empirical grounding of normative
fully-developed market for Internet-based public offer- claims concerning the functioning of market institutions.
ings have not yet been nurtured. The following section While economic and financial theory has consistently
explores the possibility of creating a more hospitable been imported into contemporary legal scholarship, the
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have recently challenged some of the orthodox eco- social interaction that are conducive to cooperation
nomic presumptions pertaining to rational human beha- rather than conflict. 168 Groups of people who are capable
viour. 162 While not purporting to discount the value of of ‘‘embedding’’ such norms are more capable of trusting
orthodox economic analysis, this paper attempts to high- than those that are not, or they will at the very least
light how several components within the field of create a system of beliefs that enables them to make
behavioural economics can prove useful in guiding certain judgments concerning whether or not to trust. 169
securities regulators, lawyers, and academics to a fuller
A problem arises because the process of establishingunderstanding of the current limitations on the realiza-
trust can be costly. The establishment of trust imposestion of a functioning disintermediated marketplace for
costs; however, the introduction of cost-saving measurespublic offerings of securities.
can increase efficiency and ultimately reduce long-term
costs. In order to reduce the ultimate costs of trusting,
private sector institutions operating as professional gate-The concept of trust 
keepers have been established to uphold the norms and
The concept of trust is readily comprehensible, yet values that are important to the immediate society. How-
difficult to reduce to an accurate narrative description. ever, to be effective and legitimate, these gatekeeping
The early economic literature on the subject recognized institutions must be regulated by higher-order gate-
that informal, unwritten guarantees are preconditions for keepers. In essence, public law supports private trust by
trade and production. As Akerlof described in respect of punishing deviations from trustworthy behaviour. 170 In
the market for ‘‘lemons’’, ‘‘[w]here these guarantees are turn, trustworthy behaviour is rewarded, both privately
indefinite, business will suffer’’. 163 Although intelligent through the creation of the trustworthy ‘‘reputation’’,
contracting agents are adept at introducing specific con- and publicly through the institutionalization and legali-
tractual provisions to compensate for perceived indeter- zation of gatekeeping norms. In essence, therefore, the
minacies in the law pertaining to implied contractual dilemma can be reduced to one of organizing the public
terms, large gaps nevertheless remain in the system of and private provision of gatekeeping services into a
trust-based protective mechanisms that simply cannot be system of public and private incentives that is optimal to
closed by drafting terms into agreements or applying the establishment of trust in a given environment.
econometric formulas. 164 These issues are relational in
nature and depend on a range of factors that typically In the context of the present discussion, further vari-
cannot be reduced to writing or legislated into effect. ables must be considered that do not mitigate but rather
They require solutions that extend beyond substantive add dimensions to the problems underlying the concept
law to issues of human cognition and behaviour. of trust. First, it must be recognized that the establish-
The concept of trust is multifaceted and interdisci- ment of trust in the securities law context can be particu-
plinary. In the words of one scholar surveying the various larly ‘‘expensive’’. In securities law, the concept of trust is
disciplines: fiercely interwoven with the ingrained issues of informa-
tional asymmetries and the gatekeeping intermediariesTo trust is . . . to organize our world. This must be at least
partly correct for . . . in the absence of trust a person would that are responsible for transforming the informational
not get out of bed in the morning. Economics teaches us opacity of a particular issuer into a transparent and there-
that trust saves transaction costs. Sociology, politics, and psy- fore calculable variable. Of particular concern is the inse-chology teach us that to trust is to be willing to enter into
curity engendered by the inability to accept the role ofrelationships and accept the authority and will of others. To
particular intermediaries in rectifying informational defi-trust is, in my own field of corporate law, to be willing to
invest your money in a corporation managed by people you ciencies. Moreover, there is a select group of market
have never seen, you have never met, about whom you actors who thrive on the absence of trust. These individ-
know very little, and some of whose names you may not uals specifically attempt to capitalize on the standardknow at all. 165
dialectic of risk and return (i.e., the ‘‘possibility of above-
Although the various disciplines approach the topic from average return inevitably carries with it above average
differing perspectives, there are several general points of risk’’), a factor that can compromise the foundations of
agreement. The first is that by definition, the concept of trust. 171
trust is concerned with the intentions and incentives of
the trusted. 166 The second is that trust’s basic function is Second, the variable of transacting in cyberspace
to reduce the uncertainty and complexity of life; the adds a further element of expense. In cyberspace, the rule
mechanisms of trust assist us by extrapolating from pre- of law is not fully entrenched. The cyberspace domain
vious experiences when faced with new situations167 and has also not yet witnessed the introduction of fully-
guide us in making rational choices based upon those enforceable non-legal sanctions. ‘‘Reputation’’ does not
prior experiences. yet carry the same pedigree in the world of cyberspace as
The creation of trust involves impounding past it does in the tangible world of shopping centres, auto-
practices and decisions into current and anticipated life mobile dealerships or investment banks. Reputation
experiences. To create trust is therefore to establish a cannot easily attach to an entity that is devoid of a tan-
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fessional or transactional responsibilities. Enhanced judi-Developing trust-based intermediaries for
cial scrutiny of existing intermediaries will be necessaryInternet DPOs: The gatekeeper liability
to stimulate positive incentives to investment in aregime revisited 
reintermediated space. This is a topic that is deserving of
There is no uniform prescription for establishing specific attention and is one that cannot be adequately
trust. 173 Because the concept is fluid and case-specific, the addressed within the parameters of this paper. It is
appropriate trust-building mechanisms are malleable deserving of mention, however, that the Ontario govern-
and contextual in nature. However, because the estab- ment has recently responded to concerns over inade-
lishment of trust is largely dependent on the intentions quate public regulation of capital market intermediaries
of the trusted, a reconstituted gatekeeper liability regime by drafting a proposed statutory cause of action against
will be most effective where the intermediary has a stake ‘‘experts’’. 178
in the process, measured as the threat of formal or
informal sanction for non-trustworthy behaviour.
Establishing (private) trust in marketDevising the appropriate gatekeeper liability regime
gatekeepers requires the efficient reorganization of public and private
incentives and sanctioning activity in order to establish Private sector gatekeepers such as lawyers and audi-
an environment conducive to trust-building. Reputa- tors are sophisticated actors that are deserving of trust in
tional sanctions should be the primary device for ‘‘regu- a reintermediated capital market environment. It is diffi-
lating’’ the market for gatekeeping services, but they cult to prescribe concrete mechanisms for signaling their
should be supported by public law mechanisms that quality to the investing public, but several factors that
punish those that deviate from trustworthy behaviour. 174 contribute to their reputable stature can be highlighted.
The formal regulatory regime should remain responsive
First, securities lawyers and auditors, like investmentto investor fears of negligent and malfeasant behaviour
banks, have an existing reputation in the capital markets.on the part of issuers and intermediaries, and should
As repeat market participants, they have developed thecontinue to afford statutory civil liability for misrepresen-
necessary knowledge and skills to perform a vast array oftation and the various other regulatory sanctions cur-
complicated tasks and are sensitive to reputational sanc-rently in place. The statutory due diligence requirements
tion. They have consistently acted both to counsel theshould not be relaxed, as this would negate the role of
actions of clients and to certify information emanatingthe gatekeeper’s role of investor protection. Rather, the
from the client. Moreover, their extensive knowledge ofdue diligence standard should reflect the context of the
the offering process combined with legal and non-legalnew investigatory environment and attempt to balance
sanctions for negligence have created a practice environ-the competing policy factors of investor protection and
ment in which they are willing to outsource services forsmall business development. 175 It is also important to
which their current skill-levels prove inadequate torecognize that statutory liability regimes are imperfect,
accommodate. Hubris will be checked by the spectre ofand carry the baggage associated with the possibility of
liability, measured in reputational and other forms ofmistake, inflexibility, and regulatory capture. 176
public and private sanctions. Moreover, because they are
Common law rules, although imprecise and subject repeat players in the markets and therefore have a vested
to abuse should nevertheless remain a secondary compo- interest in maintaining their reputational character, they
nent of a responsible gatekeeper liability regime. These are less likely to participate in the unscrupulous acts that
public sector roles are not fully adequate in their current are of foremost concern to the investing public.
form. The common law standard for determining negli-
Second, the specific codes of professional conductgent misrepresentation claims177 must be refined
and general ethical obligations of lawyers and thethrough continuing judicial interpretation to import
accounting profession are recognized ‘‘reputation-greater certainty to the question of gatekeeper liability. It
forming devices’’, and reduce the risks associated withis not acceptable that auditor liability for negligent mis-
trusting. 179 Mandatory participation in a provincial lawstatements be precluded solely on the basis of policy
society or accreditation with the Canadian Institute ofconcerns such as the spectre of indeterminate liability.
Chartered Accountants carries with it a number of eth-Indeed, the common law must incorporate the policy
ical and professional requirements that members mustobjectives of investor protection and greater access to
uphold. The legitimacy of these self-governing organiza-capital for SMEs. On the other hand, expanded common
tions is anchored in their ability to monitor and alter thelaw causes of action against gatekeepers are also open to
behaviour of their members.abuse. Access to civil actions against gatekeepers can
create a surge in opportunistic behaviour by disgruntled Finally, there are an increasing number of forums
investors. While protection must be afforded to investors that monitor the credibility and trustworthiness of these
who have suffered at the hands of a negligent gatekeeper, intermediaries. In addition to the existing informal chan-
unscrupulous investors must not be provided with the nels through which the existence (or lack) of ‘‘reputa-
ability to opportunistically initiate groundless claims tion’’ and ‘‘quality’’ indicators are communicated
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the intermediary industries in great detail. Moreover, the quality of the issuer as an investment vehicle; as long as
Internet provides generalized access to a wealth of infor- the information disclosed is accurate and not misleading,
mation on the behaviour and reputations of lawyers and the intermediary has performed its role in reducing the
law firms through various Web sites and bulletin board informational asymmetry between the issuer and
services. investor. The decision of whether to invest thereafter
rests on the investor and/or its professional advisors.
Additional steps are necessary to fulfill the role of
gatekeeper in the public offering process. For example, Accountants similarly must be prepared to expand
securities lawyers must begin to accept the risk of their functional role and accept responsibility for more
expanded legal liability and reputational sanction by intensive analysis and discussion regarding the financial
providing more comprehensive due diligence opinions affairs of the issuer, where available and applicable. 185
in offering documents. Under normal circumstances, Indeed, recent events in the United States have high-
lawyers typically refrain from offering ‘‘negative comfort’’ lighted the role of auditors in precipitating calamitous
opinions180 and other expansive positive factual repre- economic events. 186 Overt malfeasance among a select
sentations in the context of rendering an opinion. In a group of malefactors has led to enhanced scrutiny of
disintermediated offering, the lawyer’s expanded role auditor behaviour by public and private sector actors.
requires that the positive factual representations remain
Finally, we must not forget that other intermediariesin the disclosure materials. The opinions must be honest
(i.e., venture capital firms) may have played a prominentand forthright, and they must be present in the offering
role in the development of an SME prior to its public-materials. Without such representations, the spectre of
offering phase. Their role must not be discounted andmistrust might loom large over the offering. The lawyer’s
must be taken into consideration when the quality of thetraditional stamp of approval provides a positive state-
offering is in question. Individual VCs and other privatement to investors that there has been ‘‘no cheating’’, a
equity firms may be subject to differing reputational orfactor which is ‘‘an important and direct supplement to
quality characteristics, but their presence in nurturingthe other means of verification offered to the buyer’’. 181
the prospective issuer throughout its gestation periodLawyers must therefore begin to cross over into
provides an additional valuable resource, and provides auncharted territory — assuming a greater level of respon-
further grounding upon which to found a solid bedrocksibility by making more positive factual representations
of trust.regarding the issuer. Such representations must be
grounded in their investigation of the issuer and subject,
of course, to protections for the lawyer in the case of the
issuer’s intentional misrepresentations or other mis-
leading practices during the investigation. Such protec-
Conclusion tions are similar to those afforded to auditors who dis-
claim against direct internal misrepresentations on the
he prospect of enhancing access to the capital mar-part of clients. T kets for SMEs is within reach. Achieving this objec-
It is expected that law firms with the ability to make tive would contribute meaningfully to the productive
such representations will charge a premium fee for such allocation of resources in the national economy. The
a service182 in order to compensate for their increased technological disintermediation of the capital markets
exposure to sanction, although the cost value of the ser- has been described as an evolutionary process that has
vice will remain substantially lower than the costs levied the power to reduce many of the barriers currently
for similar services by an underwriter. impeding access to capital. Technological innovation
alone, however, is not sufficient to effect such change. ToMoreover, it is expected that the reputational
be ultimately successful, a reconstituted capital marketquality of some lawyers will be naturally discounted. For
for SME finance must permit new and existingexample, in-house counsel will be seen to lack the neces-
intermediaries to step in and partially fill the vacuum leftsary level of independence183 required of an effective
by the reduction or elimination of the functional role ofgatekeeper, and the trust value of their services will be
the underwriter. To accomplish this goal, an environ-discounted accordingly. Also, non-specialists (i.e., lawyers
ment of trust must be nurtured, in which these newlythat do not concentrate on corporate and securities law
reconstituted intermediaries are capable of achieving suf-matters) will not be capable of signaling trust in the same
ficient reputational status to signal to investors the requi-manner as specialists.
site level of quality and confidence in the investment
Although it has been suggested that the natural securities under consideration. Capital market partici-
result of this reputational shift is that law firms will pants that are unable or unwilling to foster the condi-
exclude higher-risk clientele from the services that they tions necessary to establish trust must be prepared to
provide, 184 an argument can be made that this position is accept the alternative for smaller offerings: added costs,
short-sighted. The function of the intermediary is to underpricing, inefficiency, and ultimately, lack of access
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Notes:
1 There is no universal definition for SME. At the expense of methodolog- Australia Conference on The Future of the Financial System, July 8-9,
ical certainty, this paper will not attempt to provide a specific definition of 1996) 49 at 64, online: http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/
SME, but will defer to the various definitions provided below as constitu- Conferences/1996/Davis.pdf.
tive of an acceptable range of possible indicators. As the recent Ontario 8 G.A. Akerlof, ‘‘The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the
Securities Commission Task Force on Small Business Financing has noted: Market Mechanism’’ (1970) 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics 488.
SMEs are variously defined by reference to their revenues, assets, Regarding the tendency to drive quality dealers out of the market, see
debt facilities, length of operating history, ownership structure and/ infra note 12.
or number of employees. For example, the Canadian Chamber of 9 Ibid. at 495.Commerce has defined a ‘‘small firm’’ as one with less than $2 mil-
10 Levmore presents the idea of a ‘‘black box’’ to describe a market for alion in annual sales or fewer than 100 employees, and a ‘‘medium-
product in which the contents of the ‘‘box’’ are unknown to both thesized’’ firm as one with $2–20 million in annual sales and 100–499
buyer and the seller, with prospective investors limited to the knowledgeemployees. Statistics Canada, in its work related to SMEs, uses asset
that the property is worth something between zero and a very large value.and/or employee tests: for example, for certain purposes Statistics
Given that no more information is forthcoming, the market is consideredCanada defines a small firm as one with between $5–25 million in
to be efficient insofar as the ultimate price is reflective of everything thatassets, and for other purposes defines a small business as a business
is known about the box. Moreover, the market for the box is also reflec-with fewer than 50 employees and defines a medium-sized business
tive of the risk attitudes of the market actors who are willing to bidas one with between 50 and 100 employees. The Canadian Federa-
‘‘virtually blindly’’ on the box. See S. Levmore, ‘‘Efficient Markets andtion of Independent Business uses a definition of fewer than 20
Puzzling Intermediaries’’ (1984) 70 Va. L. Rev. 645 at 647–648.employees and/or a chartered bank lending Facility of less than
$500,000 . . . In a recent study completed by the Conference Board 11 H.E. Leland & D.H. Pyle, ‘‘Informational Asymmetries, Financial Struc-
of Canada, SMEs were defined as corporations with fewer than 100 ture, and Financial Intermediation’’ (1977) 32 Journal of Finance 371 at
employees and a bank borrowing facility of less than $1 million. In 383.
other cases, size limitations have been tailored to specific industries. 12 L.J. White, ‘‘Market Failure and Government Failures: Some Cautionary(Ontario Securities Commission, Task Force on Small Business
Implications for Financial Reform’’ in A. Harwood & B.L.R. Smith, eds.,Financing, Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Securities Commission,
Sequencing?: Financial Strategies for Developing Countries (Washington,October 1996) at 18-19.)
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997) 66 at 70. The choices may be2 C.J. Milhaupt, ‘‘The Small Firm Financing Problem: Private Information further limited by an additional side-effect of the information asymmetry
and Public Policy’’ (1998) 2 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 177 at 181. dilemma: if investors are unable to properly determine which companies
3 Section 2.1.2 of the Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 5, states that, are truthful or otherwise informationally efficient in their disclosures,
inter alia, ‘‘[t]he primary means for achieving the purposes of this Act are, investors may tend to discount the prices for the securities of all of the
issuers in the marketplace. This ‘‘adverse selection’’ problem has the(i) requirements for timely, accurate, and efficient disclosure of infor-
potential for driving quality issuers out of the marketplace in search ofmation . . .’’
other financing options, leaving the lower-quality issuers in the market.4 See, for example, D.C. Langevoort, ‘‘Information Technology and the See B.S. Black, ‘‘The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Structure of Securities Regulation’’ (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 747 Securities Markets’’ (2001) 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781 at 786–787. As Akerlof
[Langevoort, ‘‘Information Technology’’]. Writing long before the advent has described, one might envision a worst-case scenario featuring a spi-
of Internet use by private actors, Langevoort recognized that information raling series of events where ‘‘it is quite possible to have the bad driving
technology had the capacity to increase the efficiency of the investment out the not-so-bad driving out the medium driving out the not-so-good
process, thereby disrupting the position of traditional intermediaries in the driving out the good in such a sequence of events that no market exists at
marketplace for securities. all. ’’ Akerlof, supra note 8 at 490. Fortunately, however, the Canadian
5 W. Wilhelm, ‘‘Internet Investment Banking: The Impact of Information securities market features certain regulatory protections that insure
Technology on Relationship Banking’’ (1999) Journal of Applied Corpo- against the occurrence of an adverse selection ‘‘death spiral’’. Neverthe-
rate Finance 25. less, the fact remains that the informational asymmetry problem con-
tinues to discourage the capital raising efforts of SMEs.6 This proposition was presented by Professor Merritt Fox as an alternative
to two other positions describing the various approaches to understanding 13 In rather simplistic terms, efficient capital market theory can be defined
the role of the securities market. The first described the market as embod- as the existence of informational efficiency in the pricing of securities. It
ying a form of casino-capitalism, where the market is ‘‘simply a place to describes a capital market in which all of the relevant and ascertainable
speculate’’, while the second viewed the market as an instrument for information in the marketplace is directly impounded into the price of
individuals to safely deposit their savings. Both have been construed as an the securities. The theory has several permutations and is not without its
application of the efficient market hypothesis and come to the same detractors. One of the interesting questions posed by the efficient capital
conclusion: that the due diligence process does not lead to valuable markets hypothesis asks whether the effects of efficient market theory
improvements in informational efficiency. Fox supported a third and contribute to supporting or disputing the case for mandatory disclosure
enlarged conception of the securities markets in which ‘‘[s]ecurity prices laws. For a brief overview of the theory from a Canadian perspective, see
and the information that is used to establish them are central to the M. Gillen, ‘‘Capital Market Efficiency Assumptions: An Analytical Frame-
working of the three mechanisms that limit the discretion of management work with an Application to Disclosure Laws’’ (1994) 23 Can. Bus. L.J.
faced with these choices: the cost of capital to individual corporations, the 346; and C.C. Nicholls, Corporate Finance and Canadian Law (Scarbor-
market for corporate control, and stock price based management compen- ough: Carswell, 2001) at 89-101.
sation schemes’’. This contention led Fox to conclude that informational 14 ‘‘POP’’ refers to a prompt-offering prospectus prepared and distributedimprovements arising from the due diligence process produce a series of under the Prompt Offering Qualification System for short form pro-benefits which contribute to the efficient allocation productive resources. spectus distributions pursuant to National Instrument 44-101 andSee M.B. Fox, ‘‘Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter 44-101 CP (2000) 23 O.S.C.B. (Supp) 447.Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis’’ (1984) 70 Va. L. Rev. 1005 at
15 National Instrument 44-102 and 44-102CP, Shelf Distributions, (2000)1009–1010, 1015. Fox was explicitly disputing the position of Barbara
23 O.S.C.B. (Supp.) 571.Banoff, who argued that the due diligence process is unnecessary in an
efficient market, because it is not capable of producing superior informa- 16 The Shelf and POP offering systems provide an accelerated process
tion or applying more accurate analytical techniques. Banoff goes so far as whereby the issuer can rely substantially on disclosure documents that
to suggest that investors, if provided the opportunity to unbundled invest- had been previously prepared and distributed to the public. The issuer
ment banking services, would choose not to pay underwriters a premium can thereby prepare and distribute a shorter and more cost effective
to insure against company-specific risk (although she is somewhat repen- version of the prospectus document. The modified procedures for POP
tant in the case of certain new issuers and ‘‘novel’’ securities). See B.A. and Shelf distributions have been described as one manifestation of a
Banoff, ‘‘Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets and Shelf Registration: An shift in Canadian securities regulation from a transaction-based system to
Analysis of Rule 415’’ (1984) 70 Va. L. Rev. 135. Fox has correctly identi- an issuer-based system. See Nicholls, supra note 13 at 191. On the effi-
fied such views as being too narrow. ciency aspects of the different prospectus disclosure regimes, see Gillen,
7 E.P. Davis, ‘‘The Role of Institutional Investors in the Evolution of Finan- supra note 13 at 365–77. The debate over the two systems of disclosure
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detail in the American literature. See, for example, the articles by Banoff a preliminary prospectus is in a form to be signed and filed. There
and Fox, supra note 6 and A.R. Palmiter, ‘‘Toward Disclosure Choice in are a similar number of subsequent drafting sessions to put the final
Securities Offerings’’ (1999) Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1. prospectus in a form to be signed and filed. The prospectus-drafting
process is a labour-intensive exercise during which copious cups of17 The results of a recent report have indicated that small businesses have
coffee are consumed amid a vacillating oxymoronic atmosphere ofbeen unable to obtain adequate capital to fulfill their need for working
leisurely discussion and impatient haste.capital and capital for buildings, production, machinery and research and
development, with an estimated 28 per cent  of companies being unable G.R.D. Goulet, Public Share Offerings and Stock Exchange Listings
to obtain any outside funding. Canadian Labour Market and Productivity in Canada (North York: CCH Canadian Limited, 1994) at 137.
Centre, Canadian Business Speaks Out on Access to Capital (March 1995) 26 The various provincial securities regimes may have different require-at 1. ments than Ontario, a factor which could cause some additional time
18 J.L. Seglin, Financing Your Small Business (New York: McGraw-Hill, and expense. There are procedures, however, that will permit a stream-
1990) at 41. lined process in all of the jurisdictions in which the issuer is to distribute
the securities. See National Policy 43-201, Mutual Reliance Review19 M.A. Allebach, ‘‘Small Business, Equity Financing, and the Internet: The
System for Prospectuses and Annual Information Forms and NationalEvolution of a Solution?’’ (1999) 4 Va. J.L. & Tech. 3 at 15.
Policy 12-201, Mutual Reliance Review System for Exemptive Relief20 ‘‘Distribution’’ is defined broadly in section 1(1) of the Ontario Securities Applications.
Act, supra note 3, to include, inter alia, ‘‘(a) a trade in securities of an
27 The listing requirements of the various exchanges differ, and can alsoissuer that have not been previously issued’’. ‘‘Trade’’ is also defined
differ from provincial securities regulations. The listing requirements ofbroadly in section 1(1) of the Act to include such activities as ‘‘(a) any sale
the Toronto Stock Exchange requirements can be found in Part II of theor disposition of a security for valuable consideration . . . ’’ and ‘‘(e) any act,
Toronto Stock Exchange Company Manual, online: http://www.tse.com/advertisement solicitation, conduct or negotiation directly or indirectly in
en/pdf/CompanyManual.pdf. See also the Toronto Stock Exchange Filingfurtherance of any of the foregoing’’. The definition can therefore be
Guide, online: http://www.tse.com/listed/index.html (prepared for infor-interpreted to capture any of the marketing, advertising or other solicita-
mational purposes only). The requirements of the TSX Venture Exchangetion efforts that an issuer or its agents might undertake prior to the sale of
(‘‘TSX-V’’) are found in the TSX-V Corporate Finance Manual, online:securities.
http://www.tse.com/en/pdf/manual.pdf. It should also be noted that21 In a typical offering, it is the investment dealer (the investment bank), there are prescribed fees that must be paid to the exchanges on an annualwhich must be registered to distribute the securities of the issuer. In and per application basis. For example, the TSX-V currently charges anOntario, the registration requirement can be found in section 25 of the annual fee set at a minimum of $2,050 plus $50 per every $5 million inSecurities Act, ibid. Subsection (1) states that no person or company shall, market capitalization to a maximum of $5,000 in addition to listing fees,
( a) trade in a security or act as an underwriter unless the person or which are set at a minimum of $5,000 plus an additional 0.25per cent of
company is registered as a dealer, or is registered as a salesperson or the proceeds raised (to a maximum of $15,000) and a public offering fee
as a partner or as an office of a registered dealer and is acting on calculated at $500 plus 0.25 per cent  of the amount raised to a max-
behalf of the dealer; or imum of $15,000. See TSX-V Policy 1.3, Schedule of Fees.
. . . 28 Subsection 53(6) of the Regulations allow the Director to permit the
omission of any of the required financial statements. As the OSC Task(c) act as an adviser unless the person or company is registered as an
Force has noted, the Director has exercised this discretion in the past ‘‘toadviser, or is registered as a representative or as a partner or as an
waive, in the case of SMEs, the requirement for audited financial state-officer of a registered adviser and is acting on behalf of the adviser,
ments for the three or four of the least current of the five requiredand the registration has been made in accordance with Ontario financial years so that the issuer need only incorporate an audited bal-securities law and the person or company has received written ance sheet as at the end of the previous fiscal year and audited statementsnotice of the registration from the Director and, where the registra- of operations and deficit, surplus and changes in financial position for thetion is subject to terms and conditions, the person or company two most recently completed financial years’’. The Task Force explicitlycomplies with such terms and conditions. recognized ‘‘that historical audits for SMEs, which are often performed ex
22 The prospectus requirement can be found in section 53–64 of the Act. post facto, are difficult, time consuming and expensive and do not pro-
Section 53(1) states that: ‘‘No person or company shall trade in a security vide materially better disclosure for SMEs than auditor comforted state-
on his, her or its own account or on behalf of any other person or ments’’, concluding that ‘‘the principal benefit of auditor involvement is
company where such trade would be a distribution of such security, the discipline of the process rather than the production of financial
unless a preliminary prospectus and a prospectus have been filed and statements’’. OSC Task Force, supra note 1 at 72. Similarly, the proposed
receipts therefor obtained from the Director’’. Pursuant to section 56(1) a OSC Rule 52-101 has attempted to relax some of the requirements in
prospectus must provide ‘‘full, true and plain disclosure of all material National Policy 48 concerning the disclosure of future-oriented financial
facts relating to the securities issued or proposed to be distributed . . . ’’. information (FOFI). The proposed rule will provide certain exceptions for
start-up issuers (defined as issuers whose business has been conducted for23 Certain exemptions have been carved out to permit private placements
24 months or less).to certain classes of investors. These exempt distributions are subject to
additional restrictions. For example, there are ‘‘hold periods’’ on the resale 29 A.L. Riding, ‘‘Financing Entrepreneurial Firms: Legal and Regulatory
of such securities wherein investors must refrain from trading the securi- Issues’’ (research paper prepared for the Task Force on the Future of the
ties obtained under the exemption for a specified period of time. See Canadian Financial Services Sector, September, 1998) at 69, online: http:/
OSC Rule 45-501, Exempt Distributions (2001) 24 O.S.C.B. 7011. /finservtaskforce.fin.gc.ca/research/pdf/rr9_e.pdf. As an illustration of how
the non-underwriter direct costs also disproportionately affect small24 In a typical offering, the issuer must retain legal counsel and hire an
issuers, it has been estimated such costs represent approximately 8.5 perunderwriter to distribute the securities. An auditor must also be retained
cent  of the issue price for offerings of less than $1 million, whereas theto prepare audited financial statements.
same costs represent only 0.9 per cent  of the issue price for offerings of25 Pursuant to section 61(1) of the Act, the Director ‘‘shall issue a receipt for $100–200 million. See S. Rousseau, ‘‘Internet-Based Securities Offerings
a prospectus . . . unless it appears to the Director that it is not in the by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Attractions and Challenges’’
public interest to do so’’. Subsection 61(2) contains a long list of reasons (2001) 35 Can. Bus. L.J. 226 at 231.
which would enable the Director to refuse to issue a receipt. The drafting
30 An American source has suggested that printing costs for an IPO canprocess has been described as ‘‘an intensive coordinated process in which
range from $75,000 to $150,000. See D.P. Sutton & M. Willian Benedetto,the participants meet for many hours at a stretch and discuss in detail
Initial Public Offerings: A Strategic Planner for Raising Equity Capitaland line-by-line the draft prospectus circulated to them prior to the
(Chicago: Probus Publ., 1988) at 85. Printing costs for an offering that ismeeting’’. Goulet adds:
distributed only in Canada are substantially lower, depending on the sizeSometimes a participant may be pejoratively called a nit-picker for of the deal and the number of intended recipients of the prospectus. Thepicayune quibbles over grammar or punctuation (e.g., a comma price will range from $15–20,000 for a small to mid-sized Canadianshould be a semicolon, etc.) but on the whole cavils are few and offering. The price will be raised substantially if the offering extends toparticipant input is on a more elevated level. At a drafting session the United States.the draft is edited and revised as a result of discussions and prior
investigations, inspections and research by the parties in anticipation 31 It should also be noted that underwriting rates for smaller offerings fall
of the meeting . . . It is not unusual to have six or more drafting within the higher range, which is partially reflective of the higher risk of
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32 M.J. Robinson, ‘‘Raising Equity Capital for Small and Medium-sized The model is based on the existence of information asymmetries
Enterprises Using Canada’s Public Equity Markets’’ in P.J.N. Halpern, ed., about firm value between two groups of investors: (i) informed
Financing Growth in Canada (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1997) investors who have perfect or superior knowledge about firm value,
593 at 599, citing a study by Jeffrey MacIntosh, ‘‘Legal and Institutional and (ii) uninformed investors who lack special knowledge about
Barriers to Financing Innovative Enterprise in Canada’’ Discussion Paper, firm value. The competition between informed and uninformed
Queen’s University School of Policy Studies (1994). investors for good offerings induces an adverse selection mechanism
where uninformed investors get securities in poor quality issues with33 Ibid. at 600. A recent example can be found in the December 12, 2002 greater probability. While uninformed investors will bid for newProspectus for the recent IPO conducted by Metallic Ventures Inc., which issues indiscriminately, informed investors will generally only sub-raised $24 million. In that deal, the underwriting fees were equal to scribe to an issue where its expected after-market price exceeds theapproximately 10 per cent  of the offering price. (Online on SEDAR at offering price. Thus, informed investors will subscribe to morehttp://www.sedar.com/csfsprod%2Fdata34%2Ffilings%2F00491376 shares of the good quality issuers, leaving the uninformed investors%2F00000011%2Fh%3A%5CPrivate%5CFILINGS%5CMetallic%5CIPO with a disproportionate number of the less successful issues that will%5CPros02%5CAmend%5 CAmFinPro.pdf.) be overpriced . . . Rational investors who realize that they receive a
34 For example, the underwriters in the scuttled $5 billion Hydro One IPO disproportionate amount of overpriced securities will refuse to par-
in Ontario were only expected to charge a commission of approximately ticipate in the IPO market unless they are compensated for their
2.25 per cent . A. Willis, ‘‘Eves, First Boston pass ethical test on Hydro informational disadvantage. Therefore, according to the winner’s
One IPO,’’ Globe and Mail, 4 April 2002, at B14. The underwriting fees curse model, IPOs are underpriced to keep uninformed investors in
for the recent initial public offering by the TSX Group, which intends to the market and to ensure that new issues are fully subscribed. The
raise approximately $341.6 million, amount to approximately 4.9 per excess returns on underpriced issues compensate uninformed inves-
cent  of the offering price. (Online on SEDAR at http://www.sedar.com/ tors for the losses they incur when they bid for overpriced issues.
c s f
Rousseau, supra note 29 at 235. See also C.B. Barry & R.H. Jennings,s p r od%2Fda t a34%2F f i l i n g s%2F00480106%2F00000027%2 ‘‘The Opening Price Performance of Initial Public Offerings ofFSEDAR%3A%5Cengclean.pdf.) Common Stock’’ (1993) 22 Financial Management 54.
35 R.A. Booth, ‘‘Discounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate Finance’’ 41 See N. Ursel, ‘‘Priced to Sell: The Evolution of Underpricing in Canadian(1991) 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1055 at 1092.
Initial Public Offerings’’ (2000) 8 Canandian Business Economics 15
36 See, for example, S.M. Tinic, ‘‘Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of [Ursel, ‘‘Priced to Sell’’]. While Ursel’s literature review finds what might
Common Stock’’ (1988) 43 Journal of Finance 789; K. Rock, ‘‘Why New be classified as ‘‘optimistic’’ levels of underpricing in Canadian equity
Issues are Underpriced’’ (1986) 15 Journal of Financial Economics 187; markets, her study is more valuable for revealing that most of the Cana-
A.P. Ljungqvist, V. Nanda & R. Singh, ‘‘Hot Markets, Investor Sentiment, dian literature has focused on offerings listed on the TSE. She notes that
and IPO Pricing’’ NYU Stern School of Business Working Paper such findings are likely not indicative of the economic environment
(October 29, 2001), online: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~aljungqv/papers/ faced by SMEs listing on the CDNX (now the TSX-V), where smaller-
sentiment.pdf; L.A. Stout, ‘‘The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An capitalization Canadian companies are likely to be listed, and cites recent
Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation’’ studies that reinforce this hypothesis. See Robinson, supra note 32 and
(1988) 87 Mich. L. Rev. 613. N.D. Ursel, ‘‘Hot Issue Markets in Canada’’ unpublished working paper,
University of Windsor (2000).37 L. Lowenstein, ‘‘Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to SEC Rule
19c-4 and to Professor Gilson’’ (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 979 at 998. 42 See, for example: R.G. Ibbotson, ‘‘Price Performance of Common Stock
Professor Lowenstein has decried the incentives created during ‘‘late New Issues’’ (1975) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 235; and T.
stages of bull markets when investors’ wits are dulled and their appetites Loughran, J.R. Ritter & K. Rydqvist, ‘‘Initial Public Offerings: Interna-
whetted, by the prospect of easy money’’. He describes the sales tech- tional Insights’’ (1994) 2 Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 165.
niques that inhere in this type of market and the consequent impacts on 43 J.A. Shayne & L.D. Soderquist, ‘‘Inefficiency in the Market for Initialmarket volatility as follows (Ibid. at 999):
Public Offerings’’ (1995) 48 Vand. L. Rev. 965 at 966. See also T.
If new issues seem to be ‘‘bargains’’, it is because they have been Loughran & J.R. Ritter, ‘‘The New Issues Puzzle’’ (1995) 50 Journal of
consciously priced as such. The salesperson . . . can pull out his Finance 23.
spreadsheet and show that this or that new issue is ‘‘cheap’’. And he 44 S. Espenlaub, A. Gregory & I. Tonks, ‘‘Re-assessing the Long-Termis right — in some very myopic sense. Almost by magic, many a new
Underperformance of UK Initial Public Offerings’’ (2000) 6 Europeanissue moves to a premium price the very day of the offering. This
Financial Management 319.‘‘found money’’ whets appetites, of course, and refuels the process.
But eventually the bull market in stocks as a whole dies, bringing 45 Ursel, ‘‘Priced to Sell’’, supra note 41 at 15.
even greater losses in these ‘‘bargain’’ new issues.
46 Put another way, ‘‘the entrepreneurs who founded the company are38 A ‘‘firm commitment’’ underwriting is commonly referred to as a selling it too cheaply’’, and are thus ‘‘giving much of the value of the
‘‘bought deal’’ or ‘‘offer to sell’’, reflecting the fact that the underwriter company to those who first buy its shares on the stock exchange’’. Ursel,
agrees to purchase all of the securities subject to distribution prior to the ibid. at 15.
offering. The underwriter then assumes the responsibility for reselling the
47 L.M. Benveniste, S.M. Erdal & W.J. Wilhelm, ‘‘Who Benefits from Secon-securities to investors. The effect is to relieve the issuer of some of the
dary Market Price Stabilization of IPOs?’’ (1998) 22 Journal of Banking &underlying risk involved in both the market price and the saleability of
Finance 741. The authors argue that underwriters and their brokeragethe securities. Nevertheless, the underwriter typically retains some risk-
house affiliates employ stabilization techniques that pressure retail inves-sharing protections in the form of carefully drafted ‘‘market out’’ clauses.
tors to retain ownership of their shares for an extended period of timeSee M.R. Gillen, Securities Regulation in Canada (Scarborough: Carswell,
after the offering while simultaneously permitting ‘‘large quantity, pre-1998) at 21-22. This can be contrasted with a ‘‘best efforts’’ or ‘‘agency’’
sumably institutional’’ selling pressure on the same securities. This effectdeal in which the underwriter does not purchase the issuer’s securities in
is mitigated, however, in the case of ‘‘poorly-received offerings’’, in whichadvance, but instead agrees to act as an agent for the issuer in selling the
secondary market trading is less voluminous. Ibid. at 765.shares.
48 Shayne & Soderquist, supra note 43 at 977.39 R. de R. Barondes, ‘‘Dynamic Economic Analyses of Selected Provisions of
Corporate Law: The Absolute Delegation Rule, Disclosure of Interme- 49 Ibid. at 966.diate Estimates and IPO Pricing’’ (1994) 7 DePaul Bus. L.J. 97 at 137.
50 M. Andrews, Initial Public Offerings: The Experience of Eight Canadian40 R.P. Beatty & I. Welch, ‘‘Issuer Expenses and Legal Liability in Initial Growth Companies (Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada, 1995) at 10.Public Offerings’’ (1996) 39 J.L. & Econ. 545 at 552. The authors cite a
number of studies that attempt to explain how riskier offerings require 51 The energy devoted to the process is equivalent to human capital that has
more underpricing. These studies have suggested that the tendency is been diverted away from current management operations. This tends to
based on one or more of the following: the signaling of quality, reducing occur at what is typically a crucial moment in the life cycle of the
the risk of subsequent legal action, to facilitate pre-selling, and/or to business, as working capital is low (or may even be in a deficit position)
compensate uninformed investors for the winner’s curse. A recent Cana- and little attention is paid to maintaining relationships with customers,
dian article on the subject of Internet-based securities offerings has suppliers, employees, and lower-level management. If the capital raising
accepted the winner’s curse model of underpricing, summarizing it suc- efforts are ultimately unsuccessful, the spiraling effects of diverted human
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D.A. Sander, ‘‘Everything You (Don’t) Want to Know About Raising an intermediary with the exception of those at the ‘‘bottom of the barrel’’.
Capital’’ (Nov-Dec 1989) Harv. Bus. Rev. 70 at 70-–71. Leland and Pyle, supra note 11 at 384.
52 OSC Task Force Report, supra note 1 at 33–34. 62 See G.L. Priest, ‘‘A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty’’ (1981) 90
Yale L.J. 1297 at 1303.53 Ibid. at 34.
63 See S.J. Grossman, ‘‘The Informational Role of Warranties and Private54 See A.N. Berger & G.F. Udell, ‘‘The Economics of Small Business Finance:
Disclosure About Product Quality’’ (1981) 24 J.L. & Econ. 461, for anThe Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth
excellent discussion of the role of consumer product warranties inCycle’’ (1998) 22 Journal of Banking & Finance 613. The authors note
resolving information problems in a market for goods or services.that small businesses can be considered to have a financial growth cycle
in which the financial needs and options of the business change ‘‘as the 64 S.J. Choi, ‘‘Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the Regulation of
business grows, gains further experience, and becomes less information- Small Business Capital Formation’’ (1998) 2 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L.
ally opaque’’. Smaller businesses at the beginning of their life cycle must 27 at 45.
rely upon insider finance, trade credit, and/or ‘‘angel’’ finance for their 65 S.J. Choi, ‘‘Market Lessons for Gatekeepers’’ (1998) 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 916initial financing needs. As the business matures, the firm may gain access
at 927-928 [Choi, ‘‘Market Lessons’’]. George Stigler has presented a sim-to intermediated sources of capital, including venture capital or bank
ilar formula for sellers ‘‘searching’’ for the most favourable price throughloans. Ultimately, if the business is successful and continues to mature,
a market canvass. He argued that for sellers, the ‘‘optimum amount ofthey may gain access to the public markets. Ibid. at 622.
search will be such that the marginal cost of search equals the expected55 Angel financing refers to capital contributions from individual sources increase in receipts’’. See G.J. Stigler, ‘‘The Economics of Information’’
who typically do not assume any of the day-to-day management func- (1961) 69 Journal of Political Economy 213 at 216. While Stigler looked
tions of the enterprise. Such investments are often undertaken by friends at the value of advertising in eliminating uncertainty, in our situation, the
and family of the business owner, clients of the business, or other individ- ‘‘search’’ costs of gathering and evaluating information by third parties by
uals who have been solicited for support. See G.W. Fenn et al., The issuers are ultimately impounded into the market price of the security.
Economics of the Private Equity Market (Staff Study of the Board of 66 See infra note 98 to 102 and accompanying text, which examines theGovernors of the Federal Reserve System, November 1995). See also J.
reluctance of investment banks to underwrite smaller issues of securities.Lerner, ‘‘‘Angel’ Financing and Public Policy: an Overview’’ (1998) 22
Journal of Banking & Finance 773 and S. Prowse, ‘‘Angel Investors and 67 R. Kraakman, ‘‘Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
the Market for Angel Investments’’ (1998) 22 Journal of Banking & Strategy’’ (1986) 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 53 at 57 [Kraakman, ‘‘Gatekeepers’’].
Finance 785. 68 According to Charles Darwin, the ‘‘fight or flight’’ mechanism is a natural56 J.G. MacIntosh, ‘‘Venture Capital Exits in Canada and the United States’’ bodily response to external stress, which triggers coping or exit strategies
in P.J.N. Halpern, ed., supra note 32 at 279. MacIntosh argues that there to avert danger. C. Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and
are two prices that ‘‘dominate’’ the decision for venture capital firms in Animals (1872).
choosing whether to invest in a company: ‘‘the entry (purchase price) and 69 Professor Kraakman presents an interesting set of descriptive analogies forthe exit price’’, both of which are ‘‘inextricably linked’’. Ibid at 279. See
the different options open to gatekeepers, labeling gatekeepers that dis-also D.J. Cumming & J.G. MacIntosh, ‘‘Venture Capital Investment Dura-
rupt conduct by excluding services as ‘‘bouncers’’ and gatekeepers thattion in Canada and the United States’’ University of Toronto Capital
work to change present or expected conduct as ‘‘chaperones’’. SeeMarkets Institute Working Paper (May 18, 2000), online: http://
Kraakman, ‘‘Gatekeepers’’, supra note 67 at 63.www.rotman.utoronto.ca/cmi/papers/paper5-1.htm.
70 A more benign signal from the underwriter might be evident in the57 Milhaupt, supra note 2 at 178. See also A. Godley & D.M. Ross, ‘‘Introduc-
underwriter’s choice of underwriting agreement. For example, the under-tion: Banks, Networks, and Small Firm Finance’’ in A. Godley and D.M.
writer might choose to pursue an agency deal as opposed to a firmRoss, eds., Banks, Networks and Small Firm Finance (London: Frank Cass,
commitment underwriting.1996) at 1.
71 T.S. Campbell & W.A. Kracaw, ‘‘Information Production, Market Signal-58 For example, in the Province of Ontario, statistics indicate that small
ling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation’’ (1980) 35 Journal ofbusinesses (defined as businesses with fewer than 100 employees)
Finance 863 at 864. The authors, in attempting to refine the propositionaccount for 53 per cent of private sector employment and constitute
of Leland and Pyle that information production is a sufficient condition98 per cent of all firms operating in the province. Ontario, Committee on
for the emergence of intermediaries in otherwise imperfect capital mar-Access to Capital, Financing Jobs and Growth, Report to the Minister of
kets, offered that intermediation occurs as a result of a confluence ofFinance, February 1997 at 2, online: http://www.gov.on.ca/FIN/english/
complementary explanations. They argued that intermediaries emerge asss-engli.pdf. A recent federal report has produced similar results, finding
‘‘because the production of information, the protection of confidentiality,that of the approximately 928,000 business enterprises in Canada,
the provision of transaction services, as well as other intermediary ser-75.4 per cent had fewer than 5 employees, 17.8 per cent  had 5 to 19 paid
vices, are naturally complimentary activities’’. While this author cannotemployees, 4.3 per cent  employed between 20 and 49 people, and the
dispute the logic of their contention, ultimately it will be argued that theremaining 2.4 per cent  of firms had more than 50 employees. See Riding,
complementary functionality does not present a persuasive argumentsupra note 29 at 9.
against disintermediation, given the impact of the current market for59 Benveniste et al., supra note 47 at 742. See also M. Pagano, ‘‘The Floata- intermediary services on specific constituencies (notably SMEs) by such
tion of Companies on the Stock Market: A Coordination Failure Model’’ conglomeration. Moreover, their general argument raises issues of con-
(1993) 37 European Economic Review 1101 at 1125. flicts of interest in large investment banking institutions, a topic that
extends far beyond the scope of this paper.60 Section 58 of the Securities Act (Ontario), supra note 3, requires that a
prospectus shall contain a certificate signed by the chief executive officer, 72 For a fuller discussion on this point, see Kraakman, ‘‘Gatekeepers’’, suprathe chief financial officer and any two directors of the issuer duly author- note 67 at 66–74.ized to sign and any person or company who is a promoter of the issuer
73 Section 127 of the Securities Act (Ontario), supra note 3, permits thestating that the information contained in the prospectus ‘‘constitutes full,
Commission to make one or more of the following orders: the suspen-true and plain disclosure of all material facts relating to the securities
sion, restriction or termination of a person or company’s registration,offered by this prospectus as required by Part XV of the Securities Act and
cease trading orders, the revocation of previously-granted exemptionthe regulations thereunder’’.
orders, a reprimand, orders forcing a person from resigning their position61 Recall the discussion on the pricing implications of informational asym- as director or officer of an issuer and/or prohibiting that person frommetry and the consequences of adverse selection, supra notes 7–16 and becoming a director or officer of an issuer.accompanying text. As Leland and Pyle have suggested, the effects of
intermediation on such factors are twofold: either sellers of securities 74 Statutory civil liability for misrepresentation in the Ontario Securities Act
with favourable risk characteristics (or at a minimum, quality informa- can be found in sections pertaining to prospectus disclosure (s. 130),
tion) will prefer to deal through an informationally-efficient intermediary offering memorandums (s. 130.1) and circulars (s. 131). Section 130(1)
rather than subjecting their securities to an uninformed marketplace of provides for a common law right of action for damages or rescission
investors; and second, with the segmentation of quality issuers through against (a) the issuer or selling security holder, (b) the underwriter, (c)
the services of an intermediary, the ‘‘average’’ price of the remaining every director of the issuer, (d) ‘‘every person or company whose consent
securities in the market will be less valuable, creating inducements to the has been filed’’, and (e) ‘‘every person or company who signed the pro-
use of an intermediary by ‘‘the next best risks’’. Ultimately, it is predicted spectus or the amendment to the prospectus’’. Subsection 130(2) provides































































Establishing Trust in a Disintermediated Capital Market 67
edge of the misrepresentation. Liability under section 130 is further and to such banking transactions as are designated by the regula-
limited by the ‘‘due diligence’’ defences provided in subsections 130(3) tions.
where the issuer/intermediary ‘‘had no reasonable grounds to believe For comparative purposes, the term ‘‘underwriter’’ is defined inand did not believe there had been a misrepresentation’’ or 130(4) and the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1933 as ‘‘any person who has(5) where it must be established that the intermediary (a) ‘‘failed to purchased from [a company] with a view to, or offers to sell for [aconduct such reasonable investigation as to provide reasonable grounds company] in connection with, the distribution of any security, orfor a belief that there had been no misrepresentation’’; or (b) believed participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any suchthere had been a misrepresentation. Pursuant to subsection 130(8), all of undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct orthe parties listed in subsection (1) are subject to joint and several liability. indirect underwriting of any such undertaking.’’ 15 U.S.C. §
75 The common law liability of an intermediary can be founded in negli- 11b(a)(11) (2001).
gence and requires the plaintiff to establish that the intermediary 85 See S.N. Allen, ‘‘A Lawyer’s Guide to the Operation of Underwritingbreached a duty of care owed to the investor. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Syndicates’’ (1991) 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 319. Allen provides a detailedHeller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) was the seminal case which overview of the underwriter’s role in the public offering process,first permitted a third party to assert a claim against an intermediary (in including a detailed examination of the division of labour amongst thethis case, a solicitor) for negligent loss owing to a misstatement . Ulti- various firms operating within a typical underwriting syndicate.mately, the issue falls to that of the existence of a duty of care to the
86 U.S. v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (SD NY, 1953) at 650. The case involvedplaintiff. The test for breach of duty of care in this context was set out in
an anti-trust suit initiated by the U.S. federal government against seven-Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.) by Lord
teen investment banking firms accused of various violations of theWilberforce. It involves a two-step analysis which inquires as to whether,
Sherman Anti-Trust law. It provides an excellent historical and functionalfirst, there is a sufficient relationship of proximity between the parties,
overview of the role of investment banks in the American economy.and second, whether there are any considerations which ought to nega-
tive, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to 87 See, for example, section 25(1) of the Ontario Securities Act.
whom it is owed. The case was adopted and applied by the Supreme
88 The extensive IDA Rulebook is available online at http://www.ida.ca/Court of Canada in Kamloops (City) vv. Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, 10
Files/Regulation/RuleBook/RuleBook_en.pdf.D.L.R. (4th) 641, and Hercules Managements Ltd. v. Ernst & Young,
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 165, 146 D.L.R. (4th) 577. In the latter case, the Supreme 89 S.P. Ferris, J.S. Heller, G.A. Wolfe & E.S. Cooperman, ‘‘An Analysis and
Court of Canada elaborated upon the second branch of the test in Anns Recommendation for Prestigious Underwriter Participation in IPOs’’
by recognizing the existence of broad policy considerations that militate (1992) J. Corp. L. 581 at 583.
against the imposition of liability on third-party intermediaries (in that 90 J.J. Hass, ‘‘Small Issue Public Offerings Conducted Over the Internet: Arecase, auditors). After reviewing the arguments for imposing a broad duty
They ‘Suitable’ for the Retail Investor?’’ (1998) 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 67 at 96.of care on auditors, the court held (at para. 36) that ‘‘the possible reper-
cussions of exposing auditors to indeterminate liability are significant’’ 91 See D.C. Langevoort, ‘‘Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of
and thus allowed policy considerations to negate the prima facie duty of ‘Technological Disintermediation’ for Unregistered Offerings of Securi-
care. The case was not without its detractors, and there are persuasive ties’’ (1998) 2 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 1 at 13 [Langevoort, ‘‘Angels’’].
arguments that intermediaries such as auditors (and lawyers) should 92 See Allen, supra note 85 at 340–1, who explains that roadshow presenta-anticipate the fact that their financial statements (and legal opinions) will
tions:be examined by investors in the process of determining the investment
quality of the issuer: See, for example, M.E. Deturbide, ‘‘Liability of Audi- . . . consist mostly of short speeches and presentations by the issuer’s
tors — Hercules Managements Ltd. et. Al. v. Ernst & Young et al.’’ (1998) CEO, CFO and other senior management members, along with
77 Can. Bar Rev. 260 at 263. one-on-one meetings with particular investors expected to make
large purchases of securities in the offering. The presentations give76 Kraakman, ‘‘Gatekeepers’’, supra note 67 at 56.
details about the offering and the issuer, and may include oral77 Ibid. at 57. material that is not contained in the prospectus. Slide shows and
video tapes are often used but the preliminary prospectus contained78 Ibid. See also J.C. Coffee, ‘‘No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick: An
in the registration statement is the only written material that isUnscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment’’
distributed to potential investors. Counsel for the issuer and under-(1981) 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386. Kraakman also alludes to the ‘‘administra-
writers often render general advice concerning the contents of thetive’’ costs of such an approach. See G.S. Becker, ‘‘Crime and Punishment:
materials used in the roadshow, but rarely actually attend theAn Economic Approach’’ (1968) 76 Journal of Political Economy 169.
presentations.79 R.H. Kraakman, ‘‘Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
93 Rousseau, supra note 29 at 245–6.Controls’’ (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 857 at 889–890 [Kraakman, ‘‘Corporate
Liability’’]. 94 Ferris et al., supra note 89 at 584.
80 Z. Goshen & G. Parchomovsky, ‘‘On Insider Trading, Markets, and ‘Nega- 95 Rousseau, supra note 29 at 246.
tive’ Property Rights in Information’’ (2001) 87 Va. L. Rev. 1229 at 1263. 96 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 81 at 620.81 R.J. Gilson & R.H. Kraakman, ‘‘The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’’ 97 See the discussion pertaining to the direct and indirect costs of an initial(1984) 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 at 604.
public offering, supra at notes 29–56 and accompanying text.82 Mann argues that the reputation of the intermediary (which he calls 98 In the words of the OSC Task Force on Small Business Financing, supra‘‘third-order information’’) verifies the assertions of the intermediary
note 1 at 96–97:(second-order information), which in turn verifies the informational
assertions of the principal (‘‘first-order information’’). R.J. Mann, ‘‘Verifica- . . . with few exceptions, Canadian dealers have little inclination to
tion Institutions in Financing Transactions’’ (1999) 87 Geo. L.J. 2225 at assist SMEs in raising equity capital, whether this be in an under-
2270. writing capacity, as market-makers in actively promoting the
purchase by their clients of securities in SMEs or even in analyzing83 See O.E. Williamson, ‘‘Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Sup-
these types of investment opportunities on their clients’ behalf.port Exchange’’ (1983) 73 Amercian Economic Review 519.
99 In their informative article on the topic, Ferris et al. explain that econo-84 ‘‘Underwriter’’ is defined in section 1(1) of the Securities Act (Ontario),
mists typically organize investment banking institutions into a ‘‘simplesupra note 3, as
binary classification . . . prestigious and non-prestigious’’. This binary clas-
( a) a person or company whose interest in the transaction is limited sification system is used to examine the performance characteristics of
to receiving the usual and customary distributor’s or seller’s commis- IPOs underwritten by the two groups. Although the authors imply that
sion payable by an underwriter or issuer, the binary classification system is flawed (arguing instead for ‘‘an
expanded classification design that would place underwriter prestige( b) a mutual fund that, under the laws of the jurisdiction to which it
along a continuum’’), they nevertheless recognize that there are perceivedis subject, accepts its shares or units for surrender and resells them,
differences in quality between various investment banking institutions.( c) a company that, under the laws of the jurisdiction to which it is They consequently attempt to set out a series of factors that represent thesubject, purchases its shares and resells them, or attributes of prestigious investment banks. Such factors include the ability
( d) a bank listed in Schedule I or II to the Bank Act (Canada) with to certify the quality of information released by the issuer (measured in
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handle the due diligence investigation, the level of aftermarket support significantly lower underpricing and underwriter compensation’’ in VC-
an investment dealer can offer the issuer following the offering, and backed IPOs versus non-VC-backed IPOs.
finally, the ‘‘clientele factor’’ which divides and ranks investment banks in 113 A.L. Shapiro, ‘‘Digital Middlemen and the Architecture of Electronic
terms of their client base (with more prestigious dealers selling primarily Commerce’’ (1998) 24 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 795.
to institutional investors, and lesser dealers selling to individual retail
114 It has been suggested that because distribution expenses can account forinvestors). See Ferris et al., supra note 89 at 586–588.
50 to 80 per cent  of the final cost of consumer products, the creation of100 For such institutions, the relatively small commissions relative to the distribution channels for consumer goods devoid of the friction caused
amount of labour involved in the due diligence process for a small and by traditional middlemen can create tremendous cost savings for con-
as yet unproven corporate entity combined with their reluctance to sumers. See M.N. Cooper, ‘‘Inequality in the Digital Society: Why the
stake their reputations on such an undertaking militates against their Digital Divide Deserves All the Attention It Gets’’ (2002) 20 Cardozo
participation. See Hass, supra note 90 at 95. Arts & Ent. L.J. 73 at 94.
101 See Ferris et al., supra note 89 at 585. 115 The process of financial disintermediation has been occurring in the
102 OSC Task Force Report, supra note 1 at 33. The Report recognizes that banking sector for almost 30 years, as ordinary depositors who once kept
although there are some Canadian dealers active in the market for their savings in deposit accounts at financial institutions shifted these
smaller-scale public offerings, they do not have distribution networks assets into other investment vehicles such as money market funds which
comparable to their American or Canadian large-scale counterparts. See were not subject to the interest rate ceilings of the highly-regulated
also J. MacIntosh, ‘‘Legal and Institutional Barriers to Financing Innova- banking sector. See J. Fisher, E. Harshman, W. Gillespie, H. Ordower, L.
tive Enterprise in Canada’’ School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, Ware & F. Yeager, ‘‘Privatizing Regulation: Whistleblowing and Bounty
October 1994 at 140–142. Hunting in the Financial Services Industries’’ (2000) 19 Dick. J. Int’l L.
117 at 124.103 Hass, supra note 90 at 100–102.
116 Peer-to-peer software and the proliferation of online music swapping104 In the present context, value creation by intermediaries relates to the
services such as Napster, Gnutella, and Morpheus have presented aquestion of whether the participation of the intermediary in a particular
direct threat to the monopoly previously held by record companies andbusiness transaction increases the value of the transaction (net of the fees
recording artists’ associations. See D. Skolnik, ‘‘Private Use Out of Con-charged by the intermediary) as a result of that intermediary’s participa-
trol: Disintermediation in the Music Business, While the Bands Playtion in the transaction. For an extended analysis on the concept of value
On’’ (2000) 5 I.P.L. Bull. 13.creation by intermediaries, see R.J. Gilson, ‘‘Value Creation by Business
Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing’’ (1984) 94 Yale L.J. 239. 117 Distance education has been presented as an alternative for individuals
who do not have the proximity, time or finances to justify enrollment in105 V.P. Alboini, ‘‘Due Diligence and the Role of the Securities Lawyer’’
traditional post-secondary educational institutions.(1982) 6 Can. Bus. L.J. 241.
118 An important issue in the United States is the system of managed care106 S.M. Beck, ‘‘The Role and Responsibilities of the Lawyer in the Securities
organizations (MCOs) and the possibility that disintermediated, patient-Law Context,’’ in Recent Securities and Corporate Law Developments,
directed plans could emerge to reduce the reliance (and concurrentAdvice to My Client, Public Seminar of the Canadian Bar Association
inefficiencies and quality control problems) engendered by the use of(May 8, 1980) at I-135.
MCOs. See J.V. Jacobi & N. Huberfeld, ‘‘Quality Control, Enterprise107 Kraakman, ‘‘Gatekeepers’’, supra note 67 at 83. Professor Kraakman Liability, and Disintermediation in Managed Care’’ (2001) 29 J. L. Med.
introduces the analogy of the nightclub bouncer to describe the ex ante & Ethics 305.
enforcement strategy of the securities lawyer as market gatekeeper. 119 Because increasing levels of economic activity are taking place over thePurdy Crawford has made similar comments, instead creating an
Internet and through other disintermediated forums, the traditionalanalogy between the role of the securities lawyer and that of a ‘‘referee’’.
objects of taxation have become highly decentralized and transient. SeeCrawford argues that ‘‘[t]hrough their exposure to and management of
A.J. Cockfield, ‘‘Transforming the Internet into a Taxable Forum: A Casenovel legal issues, securities lawyers gain an appreciation for the bounds
Study in E-Commerce Taxation’’ (2001) 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1171. See alsoof acceptable legal conduct and a refined sense of the norms and mores
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Policy, ‘‘Selected Taxthat govern the capital markets. As such, securities practitioners partici-
Policy Implications of Global Electronic Commerce’’ (1996), online:pating in current transactions are effectively serving as referees of future
http://www.fedworld.gov/pub/tel/internet.txt.transactions’’. P. Crawford, ‘‘A Vision of the Securities Law Practitioner as
Legal, Business, and Social Architect’’ in Securities Law in the Modern 120 Akerlof, supra note 8 at 488.
Financial Marketplace, Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper 121 Kraakman, ‘‘Gatekeepers’’, supra note 67 at 93.Canada 1989 (Toronto: DeBoo, 1989) 133 at 140.
122 See Choi, ‘‘Market Lessons’’, supra note 65 at 927.108 Professor Gilson’s argument is essentially that business lawyers operate
123 Rousseau, supra note 29 at 244.as ‘‘transaction cost engineers’’, by effectively reducing the costs to their
clients associated with business transactions such as the corporate take- 124 Allebach, supra note 19.
over. Gilson suggests that lawyers fulfill this role by creating and sus- 125 J.K. Winn, ‘‘Catalytic Impact of Information Technology on the Newtaining an environment in which the ability of the various parties to a
International Financial Architecture’’ (2000) 34 Int’l Law. 137 at 141.transaction are discouraged from engaging in opportunistic behaviour
by encouraging the production and exchange of truthful information. 126 Langevoort, ‘‘Angels,’’ supra note 91 at 15.
See Gilson, supra note 104. 127 Langevoort, ‘‘Information Technology’’, supra note 4 at 753.
109 In contrast with the transaction cost economics in Professor Gilson’s 128 Rousseau, supra note 29 at 238.approach to value creation by lawyers in the takeover context, Professor
129 H.C Fontana, ‘‘Securities on the Internet: World Wide Opportunity orUtset suggests that the securities lawyers in the initial public offering
Web of Deceit?’’ (1998) 29 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 297 at 306–7.context act as ‘‘production cost engineers’’ based on their role in the
creation of intangible bundles of information and property rights in 130 D.E. Giddings, ‘‘An Innovative Link Between the Internet, the Capital
securities where a public market for such had not previously existed. See Markets and the SEC: How the Internet Direct Public Offering Helps
M.A. Utset, ‘‘Producing Information: Initial Public Offerings, Production Small Companies Looking to Raise Capital’’ (1998) 25 Pepp. L. Rev. 785.
Costs and the Producing Lawyer’’ (1995) 74 Or. L. Rev. 275. 131 It has been suggested that the maintenance costs of a Web-based system110 Beatty & Welch, supra note 40. of disclosure is approximately $200: G. Sinclair, ‘‘Internet Direct Public
Offerings: New Opportunities for Small Business Capital Finance’’111 J. Fisch, ‘‘Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Bar-
(2001) 27 Man. L.J. 297 at 309, citing S.K. Gregg, ‘‘Regulation ‘A’ Initialrier?’’ (1998) 2 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 57. The VC ‘‘realizes’’ its
Public Offerings on the Internet: A New Opportunity for Small Busi-investment by cashing out during the IPO process or becoming a signifi-
ness?’’ (1997) 1 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 417 at 433. This can becant shareholder in the newly-public company.
contrasted with the cost of the paper-based model, for which printing112 Indeed, it has been suggested that their ability to reduce ‘‘the asymmetry
costs alone have estimated to be in the area of $75,000 and up. See supraof information between the issuing firm and investors and financial
note 31.specialists such as underwriters and auditors, venture capitalists are able
to lower the costs of going public’’. W.L. Megginson & K.A. Weiss, 132 ‘‘SEDAR’’ stands for the System for Electronic Data Analysis and
‘‘Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public Offerings’’ (1991) 46 Retrieval, the electronic filing database created in 1996 by National
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133 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Use of Electronic 145 Michael Evelyn of W.R. Hambrecht & Co., quoted in G. Wirth, ‘‘After
Media for Delivery Purposes, 60 Fed. Reg. at 53, 468. Taking Heat for Its Dutch Auction Model, W.R. Hambrecht May Have
the Last Laugh: Freddie Mac buys in, and Wall Street firms may be134 See National Policy 11-201, ‘‘Delivery of Documents by Electronic next,’’ Investment Dealers Digest, 11 December 2000.Means’’ (1999), 22 O.S.C.B. 8156, online: http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/
146 See B. Biais & A.M. Faugeron-Crouzet, ‘‘IPO Auctions: English, Dutch, . . .Regulation/Rulemaking/Policies/11-201_19991215.html, and National
French, and Internet’’ (2002) 11 Journal of Financial Intermediation 9.Policy 47-201, ‘‘Trading in Securities Using the Internet and Other
Electronic Means ’’ (1999) 22 O.S.C.B. 8170, online: http:// 147 Examples include the Santa Monica California-based Direct Stock
w w w . o s c . g o v . o n . c a / e n / R e g u l a t i o n / R u l e m a k i n g / P o l i - Market (http://www.dsm.com) and Financial Web (http://
cies/47-201_19991217.html. www.financialweb.com).
135 On the use of this term, see L. Lessig, ‘‘The Path of Cyberlaw’’ (1995) 104 148 Fisch, supra note 111 at 76–77.
Yale L.J. 1743 and T. Frankel, ‘‘The Internet, Securities Regulation, and
149 See Z.J. Acs & F.A. Tarpley, ‘‘The Angel Capital Network (ACE-Net)’’Theory of Law’’ (1999) 73 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 1319 at 1336.
(1998) 22 Journal of Banking & Finance 793.136 A recent article by Professor Anand has argued that the current ‘‘regula-
150 See  Web s i t e  o f  Gran t  S t r ee t  Group ,  on l ine :  h t tp : / /tion by analogy’’ approach is ‘‘in the long term, incompatible with a
www.grantstreet.com/perl/bond.pl.world in which corporations communicate electronically with investors
and other interested parties’’. She contends that ‘‘the CSA’s concern that 151 As at December 20, 2002, the site states that is has conducted 5,790
investors have access to a paper version of a document which is identical auctions for 517 issuers, raising over $3.48 trillion.
to the electronic version is an unnecessary and potentially misguided 152 Sjostrom, supra note 143 at 591.requirement’’. A.I. Anand, ‘‘Securities Law in the Internet Age: Is ‘Regu-
lating By Analogy’ the Right Approach?’’ (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 129 at 153 Mann, supra note 82.
132. 154 N. Tait & N. Denton, ‘‘ASX to Offer Fund Raising on the Internet’’
137 In the United States, the first Internet roadshow was undertaken by Net Financial Times, 12 June 1997, available online (WL) at 11034279.
Roadshow Inc., See Net Roadshow Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 155 Examples include Wit Capital (http://www.witcapital.com), E*Offering,SEC No-Act. LEXIS 864 (Sept. 8, 1997).
which is 28 per cent  owned by E*Trade, (http://www.eoffering.com)
138 The first Canadian roadshow was undertaken on behalf of Celestica Inc. and W.R. Hambrecht & Co.’s OpenIPO.
in its initial public offering in the Spring of 1998. See M. Deslauriers, 156 See Wilhelm, supra note 5.‘‘Taking Your IPO Roadshow Online’’ Osler Technology Business
Briefing (Fall 1998), online: http://www.osler.com/publications/Tech- 157 L.A. Mondschein, ‘‘The Solicitation and Marketing of Securities Offer-
nology/tb_brief.htm. ings through the Internet’’ (1999) 65 Brook. L. Rev. 185 at 241–2.
158 See Fontana, supra note 129 at 312.139 H. de Azevedo Ferreira Franca, ‘‘Legal Aspects of Internet Securities
Transactions’’ (1999) 5 B.U.J. Sci. & Tech. L. 4 at para. 19. 159 Sjostrom, supra note 143 at 533.
140 B.C. Eddy, ‘‘Internet Road Shows: It’s Time to Open the Door for the 160 The first Canadian Internet DPO was conducted by e-minerals Explora-
Retail Investor’’ (2000) 25 J. Corp. L. 867 at 877. tion Corporation in 1999. The second was the FLOWTHRU.COM
Limited Partnership, which conducted an initial public offering later141 S.S. Svahn, ‘‘Greater Investor Outreach at the Click of a Mouse: Internet
that year.and Closed-Circuit Roadshows Should Reach Retail Investors’’ (1999)
65 Brook. L. Rev. 249 at 279. 161 D.C. Langevoort, ‘‘Behavioural Theories of Judgment and Decision
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review’’ (1998) 51 Vand. L.142 National Policy 47-201, supra note 134. The text of subsection 2.7(2)
Rev. 1499. Langevoort argues that where judges, policymakers, and aca-pertaining to roadshows reads as follows:
demics make predictions concerning Mental models of individual and
(2) The securities regulatory authorities do not object in prin- social behavior that are ‘‘naı̈ve and intuitive [and] without any strong
ciple to an issuer or underwriter holding a roadshow over the empirical grounding, they are susceptible to error and ideological bias’’.
Internet during the ‘‘waiting period’’ in connection with a distribu- He further states that ‘‘something more rigorous is thus expected when
tion of securities. However, care should be taken to ensure that the normative claims are advanced, and the place of the social sciences has
transmission of a roadshow over the Internet complies with the expanded in legal discourse to satisfy this expectation’’. ( Ibid. at
‘‘waiting period’’ requirements and securities legislation generally. In 1499–1500).
this connection, the following guidelines are recommended:
162 See ibid., for a useful introduction to the subject matter as it impacts
1. Pursuant to securities legislation, a copy of the filed preliminary upon the various branches of the law.
prospectus is required to be made available to each viewer before
163 Akerlof, supra note 8 at 500.each roadshow transmission, and each transmission should contain
visual statements emphasizing that the information conveyed 164 Indeed, the law of express and implied warranties, typically restricted to
through the roadshow does not contain all of the information in the the realm of sales of tangible goods, has been introduced into the law of
preliminary prospectus, which should be reviewed for complete financial intermediation. See, for example, CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ.
information. A copy of the preliminary prospectus could be sent Co. (1990) 554 N.Y.S. 2d 449 at 450, which discussed the applicability of
electronically to viewers in accordance with the guidelines con- express warranty claims by an investor who questioned the accuracy of
tained in National Policy 11-201. financial information.
2. Electronic access to the transmission of a roadshow over the 165 L.E. Mitchell, ‘‘The Importance of Being Trusted’’ (2001) 81 B.U. L. Rev.
Internet should be controlled by the issuer or underwriter con- 591 at 599. Regarding the work of Luhmann, the author cites N.
ducting the roadshow, using such means as password protection, in Luhman, ‘‘Trust and Power’’ (1979).
order to ensure that all viewers are identified and have been offered 166 L.E. Mitchell, ‘‘Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law’’ (1993) 43 Duke L.J.a preliminary prospectus. Any persons or companies that are ‘‘pro-
425 at 432.spective purchasers’’ as referred to in the provisions of securities
legislation relating to roadshows may be invited to view the road- 167 Ibid.
show. 168 F. Fukyama, ‘‘Differing Disciplinary Perspectives on the Origins of Trust’’
3. An issuer or underwriter should not transmit a roadshow to a (2001) 81 B.U. L. Rev. 479 at 479-480.
person or company unless that person or company has agreed not to 169 Ibid. at 480.copy or further distribute the transmissions. An issuer or under-
170 T. Frankel, ‘‘Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet’’ (2001) 81 B.U.writer should take reasonable steps to prevent copying or further
L. Rev. 457 at 459 [Frankel, ‘‘Trusting’’]. As the author explains: ‘‘if thedistribution of transmissions.
risks and costs of reducing the risks to the trusted party are higher than143 W.K. Sjostrom, ‘‘Going Public through an Internet Direct Public the benefits, the party will not interact. If the costs to the trusted party ofOffering: A Sensible Alternative for Small Companies’’ (2001) 53 Fla. L. establishing its trustworthiness are higher than the benefits, it will notRev. 529 at 560. interact. The parties will enter into a relationship, however, if third
144 Note, ‘‘Auctioning New Issues of Corporate Securities’’ (1985) 71 Va. L. parties, including the government through the law, reduces their costs,
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171 D.C. Langevoort, ‘‘Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law 180 Estey suggests that much of the material information contained in a
from Behavioural Economics about Stockbrokers and Sophisticated prospectus ‘‘depends upon a business analysis of the issuer and of the
Customers’’ (1996) 84 Cal. L. Rev. 627 at 636. Langevoort introduces industry of which the issuer is a part, together with an analysis of what
rationales for such behaviour that extend beyond the desire to make will affect the price of the offered securities in the public securities
money, such as the play value of gambling. markets’’, and that such matters ‘‘are beyond the competence of a lawyer
as such’’. Instead, he suggests that responsibility for all such matters172 See H. Nissenbaum, ‘‘Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron?’’
should be that of the underwriter, and lawyers should therefore refrain(2001) 81 B.U. L. Rev. 635 at 646-648.
from giving opinions on such matters, instead restricting their com-173 G.R. Shell, ‘‘Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial ments to the legal aspects of the securities offering and of the due
Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action’’ (1991) 44 Vand. L. Rev. 221 diligence review. W.M. Estey, Legal Opinions in Commercial Transac-
at 258. tions, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1997). Similarly, the Legal
Opinion accord of the Business Law Section of the American Bar Associ-174 Talley has suggested that a society that benefits from ‘‘extralegal norms
ation has also suggested that ‘‘negative assurance statements’’ are gener-of honest disclosure might ironically favour more expensive legal regula-
ally inappropriate. See Committee on Legal opinions Third Party Legaltion than would a similarly situated society in which weak or non-
Opinion Report, including the Legal Opinion accord, of the Section ofexistent’’. E. Talley, ‘‘Disclosure Norms’’ (2001) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1955 at
Business Law, American Bar Association, (1991) 47 Bus. Law. 167 at 28.1958-9. While the author is correct in his suggestion that the extralegal
The contrary argument must be made in the context of the presentcontribution to the gatekeeper liability regime acts as a useful comple-
discussion that it is precisely such functions that the securities lawyerment to formal legal sanctions, the argument can be turned on its head
can and should attempt to fulfill, to the extent possible and in conjunc-to suggest that the formal legal regime should instead operate to com-
tion with other experts such as the company’s management and audi-plement the more powerful informal (or ‘‘extralegal’’) sanctioning instru-
tors. It is hereby suggested that the competence of the experiencedments at the disposal of private sector actors.
securities lawyer extends beyond attending to merely the legal minutiae175 There are credible reasons for suggesting that investor protection
of an offering; indeed, counsel is typically highly attuned to such mattersthrough informational efficiency is not the only laudible objective of
and is capable of rendering an opinion or outsourcing to the appropriatesecurities market regulation. It is suggested that the overall health of the
entity (another lawyer at the firm or an external party) where the matternational economy requires the ability of innovative and untested (and
extends beyond their competence.thereby potentially risky) young companies to be permitted access to the
181 K.S. Okamoto, ‘‘Reputation and the Value of Lawyers’’ (1995) 74 Or. L.capital markets. See the discussion regarding the effects of small busi-
Rev. 15 at 27.nesses on the economy, supra note 58 and accompanying text. Of
course, a marked deterioration in informational efficiency would make 182 Ibid. at 28.
it difficult (if not impossible) to achieve the goal of capital raising by 183 Ibid. at 28–29.small businesses. Hence, the need to achieve a workable balance
between the competing objectives. 184 Ibid. at 29.
176 Choi, ‘‘Market Lessons’’, supra note 65 at 934. 185 See the discussion, supra note 28 on the relaxation of financial state-
ment requirements for some smaller issuers who lack the financial177 See supra, note 75.
history for comprehensive audits.178 The changes were proposed in Bill 198, Keeping the Promise for a 186 The recent involvement of the global accounting firm Arthur AndersenStrong Economy Act (Budget Measures), 2002, 3d Sess., 37th Leg.,
in the bankruptcy of the multinational energy trading firm Enron hasOntario, 2002 (assented to 9 December, 2002), S.O. 2002, c. 22. ‘‘Expert’’
revealed the possibility that individual members of an auditing firmis defined in section 138.1 of the Act as:
might have deliberately destroyed documents and attempted to other-
a person or company whose profession gives authority to a state- wise shelter financial information concerning such matters as off-bal-
ment made in a professional capacity by the person or company, ance sheet partnerships from the investing public. The U.S Justice
including, without limitation, an accountant, actuary, appraiser, Department recently thereafter took the unprecedented step of issuing
auditor, engineer, financial analyst, geologist or lawyer. an indictment against the auditing firm for, among other things, destruc-
179 Frankel, ‘‘Trusting’’, supra note 170 at 470. tion of incriminating evidence.
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